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1309 
REVISITING CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
―Unlike a private buyer, the government is interested, as the sovereign, 
in achieving a wide variety of social and economic goals.‖1 Indeed, 
government contracting has been a means of effectuating socioeconomic 
policy in the United States for nearly half of a century.
2
 But these sorts of 
programs, particularly those that classify based on race, are extremely 
controversial
3
 and face a variety of legal challenges. The Supreme Court 
of the United States has severely limited the contexts in which race-based 
affirmative action may be used,
4
 and five states—California, Washington, 
Michigan, Nebraska, and Arizona—have banned such programs by ballot 
initiative.
5
 Despite this backdrop, government contracting can still be used 
to further socioeconomic policy, but to do so, the focus must move away 
from race. Politicians across the country have recognized this and are 
looking for ways to continue affirmative action–like contracting programs 
that comport with the developing law.
6
  
 
 
 1. John Montague Steadman, ―Banned in Boston—and Birmingham and Boise and . . .‖: Due 
Process in the Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 793, 799 
(1976).  
 2. See Christopher R. Noon, The Use of Racial Preferences in Public Procurement for Social 
Stability, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 611, 612 (2009) (―The use of government procurement to address these 
inequities rapidly grew in popularity in the years following the civil rights movement [of the 1960s].‖).  
 3. See infra notes 17–22 and accompanying text. 
 4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 6. See, e.g., Matthew Hansen, Steering City Work to Small Firms?, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 
July 1, 2009, at A1 (describing a committee formed by Omaha‘s mayor to redesign the Protected 
Business Enterprise program after a ballot initiative made the city‘s use of race and gender 
unconstitutional in Nebraska); Jim Harger, City Backs off ―Bid Discounts,‖ GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, 
Apr. 13, 2007, at B3 (describing a challenge to a Michigan city‘s use of race and gender in a contract 
preference program as redesigned after the ban took effect); Marisa Schultz, Panel Tells Michigan 
How to Bypass Prop 2, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 8, 2007, at A1 (quoting the spokeswoman for 
Michigan‘s governor, stating that she would ―review [a report interpreting Michigan‘s ban] and decide 
what, if any, steps [the state] need[s] to take‖); Memorandum from Don Richards, Senior Research 
Analyst, Wyo. Legislative Serv. Office, to Representative-Elect Quarberg, Wyo. State Legislature 1 
(Dec. 23, 2004), available at http://legisweb.state.wy.us/PubResearch/2004/04TM078.pdf (noting the 
interest of an incoming state representative in Wyoming, a state that does not have an affirmative 
action ban, in whether any states have such programs). Some lawmakers are explicit about their desire 
to continue minority participation through these alternative programs. See Omaha Eyes Minority 
Contract Incentives, KETV (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.ketv.com/news/21311491/detail.html 
(describing a city councilman who advocates targeting government contracts to disadvantaged census 
tracts to ―quadruple the number of minority-owned firms doing business with the city‖). 
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This Note focuses on existing class-based alternatives to race-based 
affirmative action in government contracting. Part II describes the history 
of affirmative action,
7
 the state-by-state anti–affirmative action 
movement,
8
 and the theory of class-based affirmative action.
9
 Then, three 
existing programs intended to encourage job development in 
disadvantaged areas through government contracting will be described, 
analyzed, and assessed to demonstrate the myriad ways of structuring such 
a program.
10
 Part III synthesizes this analysis, the literature analyzing the 
effect of these programs, and the theories behind class-based affirmative 
action into recommendations for public policy makers who wish to 
continue to use government contracting as a means of impacting 
socioeconomic policy in the face of the anti–affirmative action 
movement.
11
 This Note is not, however, intended to give due consideration 
to state-by-state peculiarities such as the differences in state and local 
contracting law,
12
 state constitutional law,
13
 and variations in voter 
 
 
 7. See infra Part II.A. 
 8. See infra Parts II.B & II.C.1. 
 9. See infra Part II.C.2. 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. See infra Part III. 
 12. Many governments are required to award contracts to the ―lowest and best‖ bidder, ―lowest 
responsible bidder,‖ or some variation thereof. 10 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29:81 (3d 
ed. 2009). Even where required to award the contract to the ―lowest‖ bidder, some courts refuse to 
apply a literal construction. Id. (citing Thompson Elecs. Co. v. Easter Owens/Integrated Sys., Inc., 702 
N.E.2d 1016 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998)). The term ―responsible‖ may include evaluation of compliance with 
affirmative action programs that were in the bidding requirements. MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS, supra, § 29:82 (citing Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of 
S.F., 619 F. Supp. 334 (N.D. Cal. 1985)). It may even include considerations of the bidder‘s social 
responsibility. See MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra, § 29:82 (citing Sw. Wash. Chapter, 
Nat‘l Elec. Contractors Ass‘n v. Pierce Cnty., 667 P.2d 1092, 1096 (Wash. 1983)). The general rule is 
that ―lowest and best‖ bidder can be defined by legislation to include consideration of factors such as 
minority group representation. MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra, § 29:84. Some courts, 
however, hold that only concerns of quality and cost can be considered. See, e.g., Arrington v. 
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 403 So. 2d 893, 898–99 (Ala. 1981) (invalidating a set-aside 
requirement by only allowing bid specifications ―reasonably related to contract requirements or the 
quality of the product or service in question‖); Ga. Branch, Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. 
v. City of Atlanta, 321 S.E.2d 325, 328 (Ga. 1984) (holding that a set-aside program based on sex and 
race conflicts with ―lowest and/or best bidder‖ standard).  This debate mainly centers on the goals of 
public contracting. Certain courts are concerned only with price and quality. See Atlanta, 321 S.E.2d at 
327–28. A competing conceptualization of the goals of government contracting is ―[p]rotection of the 
general public from fraud, collusion, and favoritism; and . . . [p]rovision of a fair forum for those 
interested in bidding on public contracts.‖ Pierce Cnty., 667 P.2d at 1096. The traditional definition of 
affirmative action is more in line with the second conceptualization of public contracting. See id. 
(noting that affirmative action presents no danger of fraud and encourages a fair forum by encouraging 
bids by those disadvantaged from past discrimination).  
 13. State constitutions may impose stricter equal protection requirements than the federal 
constitution. See, e.g., State ex rel. Dep‘ts of Transp. & Labor v. Enserch Alaska Constr., Inc., 787 
P.2d 624, 631–32 (Alaska 1989) (invalidating a hiring preference for residents of economically 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/6
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approval of government preferences, although these are essential concerns 
that public policy makers should bear in mind.  
II. THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND STATUTORY EMBODIMENT OF CLASS-
BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
A. The Evolving Status of Race-Based Affirmative Action 
President John F. Kennedy brought affirmative action programs to the 
forefront when he issued an executive order requiring that contractors of 
the federal government ―take affirmative action to ensure that applicants 
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without 
regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.‖14 This required 
federal contractors to do more than prohibit discrimination in their 
businesses; it required active attempts to encourage the employment of 
minorities.
15
 Since then, affirmative action has been incorporated into a 
variety of social programs outside of government contracting, including 
education and government employment.
16
  
Even a casual observer of American politics will recognize that 
affirmative action is ―one of the most controversial and divisive issues 
ever placed on the national agenda in the United States.‖17 The matter has 
been contentious from the beginning
18
 and remains so to this day.
19
 Many 
 
 
disadvantaged areas on public works projects under Alaska‘s equal protection clause, which ―provides 
greater protection to individual rights than does the U.S. Constitution‖). 
 14. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 86, 88 (1962). The early history of government-sponsored 
affirmative action is largely one of executive orders. President Kennedy is thought to have ―coined the 
term‖ affirmative action. Noon, supra note 2, at 612. Kennedy built on previous executive orders by 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who outlawed discrimination by companies involved in the defense 
industry, Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 109 (1941), and President Harry Truman, who established a 
Fair Employment Board to review complaints of discrimination under the program, Exec. Order No. 
9980, 3 C.F.R. 720 (1948). 
 15. See J. EDWARD KELLOUGH, UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, 
DISCRIMINATION, AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 7 (2006). 
 16. Affirmative action, broadly defined, is ―a variety of strategies designed to enhance 
employment, educational, or business opportunities for groups, such as racial or ethnic minorities and 
women, who have suffered discrimination.‖ Id. at 3.  
 17. Id.; see also W. ROBERT GRAY, THE FOUR FACES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: FUNDAMENTAL 
ANSWERS AND ACTIONS 1 (2001) (observing that affirmative action is ―one of the most controversial, 
contradiction-riddled, and confusing public issues of our day‖).  
 18. See KELLOUGH, supra note 15, at 3.  
 19. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Race, Ideology, and Support for Affirmative Action, GALLUP POLL 
(Aug. 23, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/poll/18091/Race-Ideology-Support-Affirmative-Action.aspx. 
In 2005, 50% of Americans favored ―affirmative action programs for racial minorities,‖ while 42% 
opposed them. Id. Blacks supported the programs at a rate of 72%, while 44% of whites were 
supportive. Id. Blacks supported the programs at rates over 70% regardless of political ideology, while 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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opponents of affirmative action label it ―reverse discrimination.‖20 The 
power of this critique is exemplified by a ―reverse discrimination‖ case21 
being one of the most significant issues in the recent confirmation of 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor to the Supreme Court of the United States.
22
  
As the public has struggled with the policy rationales underlying 
affirmative action, the Supreme Court has struggled with how such 
programs comport with equal protection jurisprudence.
23
 After a period of 
doctrinal development,
24
 the Supreme Court now applies strict scrutiny to 
any government classification based on race, including race-based 
affirmative action.
25
 Meanwhile, a group of committed opponents of 
 
 
liberal whites were more likely to be more supportive of the programs than were conservative whites. 
See id. 
 20. See REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 3 (Barry R. Gross ed., 1977). Reverse discrimination has 
been defined as ―giving special or preferred treatment to persons who are members of racial or 
religious or ethnic groups or a sex against whose membership generally unjust discrimination was or is 
being practiced.‖ Id. 
 21. Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam), rev’d, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009). 
Then-Circuit Judge Sotomayor served on the panel that decided Ricci. Id. at 87. While Ricci dealt with 
―reverse discrimination,‖ it was not about affirmative action per se. See 129 S. Ct. at 2677. The 
Supreme Court distinguished ―an employer‘s affirmative efforts to ensure that all groups have a fair 
opportunity to apply for promotions and to participate in the process by which promotions will be 
made,‖ which is essentially an affirmative action program, from ―intentional discrimination for the 
asserted purpose of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact‖ after the fact. See id. 
Despite the ex post versus ex ante contextual difference, both approaches are considered reverse 
discrimination, as the emphasis of the critique is not on time, but rather ―unfair treatment‖ to whites 
just ―because other white males have so discriminated.‖ See Lee Nisbet, Affirmative Action—A Liberal 
Program?, in REVERSE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 20, at 50, 52–53. 
 22. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Editorial, When Judicial Activism Suits the Right, N.Y. TIMES, June 
24, 2009, at A29 (noting that the ―two biggest controversies‖ in Justice Sotomayor‘s confirmation 
were Ricci and comments about the impact of a judge‘s ethnicity in her decision making).  
 23. The Supreme Court‘s first review of an affirmative action program was in DeFunis v. 
Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). KENT GREENAWALT, DISCRIMINATION AND REVERSE 
DISCRIMINATION 173 (1983). The court avoided the merits because the challenger of the program was 
set to graduate regardless of the outcome, mooting the case. 416 U.S. at 319–20. Subsequent to 
DeFunis, the Supreme Court has debated the standard of judicial review that should be applied to 
classifications based on race. See infra note 24. 
 24. By 1990, a series of fractured decisions had produced a two-tiered approach to the judicial 
review of affirmative action programs: federal government programs received intermediate review, 
and state and local government programs received strict scrutiny. See Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 
U.S. 547, 565–66 (1990) (synthesizing precedent to justify imposition of different levels of scrutiny on 
different levels of government). In a sign of just how controversial affirmative action programs are, the 
Supreme Court explicitly overruled this tiered approach in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 227 (1995).  
 25. Adarand held that ―all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local 
governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.‖ 515 U.S. at 227. 
And although the Supreme Court has reaffirmed a limited role for affirmative action in higher 
education to further diversity interests, that right was extremely cabined. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (explaining the tailoring analysis in cases raising the diversity interest); id. at 343 
(suggesting that diversity will no longer be a compelling interest in twenty-five years). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/6
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affirmative action has succeeded in persuading the voters in the states of 
California, Washington, Michigan, Nebraska, and Arizona to ban such 
programs by ballot initiative.
26
 As will be seen, affirmative action has 
literally become illegal ―[w]ithout a [c]ase‖27 in the states where these 
ballot initiatives have passed.  
B. Ward Connerly and The Modern Anti–Affirmative Action Movement 
Today, the ―the most high-profile crusader against affirmative action‖ 
is Ward Connerly.
28
 Connerly was a member of the University of 
California Board of Regents, where he successfully led an initiative to ban 
the University‘s use of race in admissions.29 He is the founder and 
president of the American Civil Rights Institute, which describes itself as 
―a national, not-for-profit organization aimed at educating the public about 
the need to move beyond race and, specifically, racial and gender 
preferences.‖30 Connerly has successfully led ballot initiatives in five 
states to end race-based affirmative action.
31
  
Connerly believes that ―the Supreme Court‘s politically correct 
decisions‖ have made ―Congress and state legislatures . . . reluctant to take 
the necessary steps to enforce the Civil Rights Act or to remove 
‗affirmative action‘ programs granting preferential treatment on the basis 
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin.‖32 He also believes that 
blacks ―have become addicted‖ to affirmative action.33 He frames his 
views not as opposition to affirmative action, which is an ―amorphous 
 
 
 26. See infra Part II.B; see also Richard Kahlenberg, Arizona’s Affirmative Action Ban, CHRON. 
OF HIGHER ED. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://chronicle.com/blogs/innovations/arizona‘s-affirmative-action-
ban/27794. 
 27. Alexander S. Elson, Note, Disappearing Without a Case—The Constitutionality of Race-
Conscious Scholarships in Higher Education, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 975, 975 (2009). 
 28. Dan Frosch, Vote Results are Mixed on a Ban on Preference, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2008, at 
A19. 
 29. About the American Civil Rights Institute, AM. CIV. RTS. INST., http://www.acri.org/ 
ward_bio.html (last visited May 1, 2011).  
 30. Id. Each state Connerly targets in this movement adopts an analogous organization. See, e.g., 
ARIZ. CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE, http://www.adversity.net/supertuesday2008/arizona.htm (last visited May 
1, 2011); MICH. CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE, http://www.adversity.net/michigan/mcri_mainframe.htm (last 
visited May 1, 2011); NEB. CIV. RTS. INITIATIVE, http://www.nebraskacri.org/media.html (last visited 
May 1, 2011). 
 31. See Kahlenberg, supra note 26.  
 32. Ward Connerly, Achieving Equal Treatment Through the Ballot Box, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL‘Y 105, 108 (2009). 
 33. George Skelton, After 209, What’s Next for Connerly?, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996, at 3. 
Connerly also stated, ―I sense this yearning among white people just to really become color blind. 
They want black people to assimilate. And black people are fighting it with every fiber of their being.‖ 
Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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term‖ that ―means different things to different people,‖ but rather as 
opposition to discrimination.
34
 This explanation of his beliefs has led some 
who support affirmative action, including people who have benefited from 
it, to sign Connerly‘s petitions, leaving them to later realize that they 
would not have signed the petitions had they understood the implication of 
their signatures.
35
 A federal court found that Connerly‘s tactics in one state 
amounted to ―systematic voter fraud by telling voters that they were 
signing a petition supporting affirmative action,‖ but the court ultimately 
found no violation of federal law because Connerly‘s organization 
―appears to have targeted all . . . voters for deception without regard to 
race.‖36  
Connerly began his movement in California,
37
 where in 1996, 54.55% 
of voters
38
 approved a constitutional amendment requiring that the state 
―not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual 
or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the 
operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting.‖39 The ballot initiative, Proposition 209, was followed and 
debated nationally, with both President Bill Clinton and then-presidential 
candidate Bob Dole taking public positions.
40
 For his influential role in 
passing this ban, a Republican fundraising group labeled Connerly ―the 
greatest hero of the 1996 elections.‖41  
Opponents of Proposition 209 challenged its validity under the Equal 
Protection Clause and Title VII.
42
 A federal district court judge entered a 
preliminary injunction barring the implementation of Proposition 209 
 
 
 34. See Dan Frosch, Colorado Petition Draws Charges of Deception, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2008, 
at A16. Connerly does not see himself as rejecting diversity, but rather ―diversity as an excuse to 
discriminate.‖ See Skelton, supra note 33. This definition of discrimination is an example of the 
―reverse discrimination‖ critique described in Part II.A. 
 35. See Frosch, supra note 34. 
 36. Operation King‘s Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 
Aug. 29, 2006). 
 37. See Tamar Lewin, Colleges Regroup after Voters Ban Race Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 2007, at A1 (noting that Connerly thought California was ―ahead of its time‖). 
 38. BILL JONES, CALIFORNIA SEC‘Y OF STATE, STATEMENT OF VOTE 13 (1996), available at 
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1996-general/1996-general-sov.pdf. 
 39. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a).  
 40. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., Affirmative Action Measure Nears a High-Profile Finish, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at B6 (noting that Proposition 209 received more national attention than any of 
the other ninety ballot initiatives on California‘s ballot that year). President Clinton opposed 
Proposition 209, while Senator Dole supported it. Id.  
 41. See Skelton, supra note 33. 
 42. See Reynolds Holding, Prop. 209 Is Blocked A 2nd Time: State likely to appeal U.S. judge’s 
injunction, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24, 1996, at A1 (noting suit filed day after election). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/6
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based on the likelihood of the challenge‘s success on the merits.43 
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found 
that the amendment was constitutional and that Title VII did not preempt 
the amendment, so the preliminary injunction was vacated.
44
 Subsequent 
challenges to these state bans on affirmative action have failed without 
exception.
45
  
Connerly‘s decision to next target the state of Washington surprised 
many observers.
46
 The state had a history of electing minorities to 
important positions and had some of the ―most inclusive‖ preference 
programs, even preferring white men in certain contexts.
47
 Before 
Connerly signed on to the Washington movement, the organization 
leading it was ―foundering‖ to achieve the 180,000 signatures needed to 
place the issue on the ballot.
48
 After Connerly‘s American Civil Rights 
Initiative donated more than $178,000 and lent its support, the requisite 
signatures were gathered.
49
 The measure, Initiative 200, ultimately passed 
with 58% of the vote.
50
 The significance of Connerly‘s involvement with 
such a movement was becoming increasingly clear.
51
 
 
 
 43. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Connerly believed 
this ―ma[de] no sense, and will go down in history as one of the most perverse examples of 
jurisprudence.‖ Tim Golden, U.S. Judge Blocks Enforcing of Law Over Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
24, 1996, at A1. 
 44. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 710–11 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 45. See infra notes 58, 63 and accompanying text. 
 46. See Steven A. Holmes, Washington State is Stage for Fight Over Preferences, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 4, 1998, at A1. 
 47. Id. However, preferences for white males may be the least ―inclusive‖ preferences as, 
historically speaking, most government-sponsored discrimination was in favor of white males. See 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 781–82 (2007) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (―Can we really be sure that the racial theories that motivated Dred Scott [v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)] and Plessy [v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)] are a relic of the past or 
that future theories will be nothing but beneficent and progressive? That is a gamble I am unwilling to 
take, and it is one the Constitution does not allow.‖). This underscores the conceptual difficulty of 
determining what is ―inclusive,‖ particularly in the race context. Cf. supra note 20 and accompanying 
text (discussing similar issues in the context of the ―reverse discrimination‖ debate). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. The American Civil Rights Institute donated more than half of the total funds that the 
Washington organization collected. Connerly‘s influence is further demonstrated by the fact that he 
did not become involved with a similar measure in Florida, where less than 40,000 of the required 
435,000 signatures were gathered. See id. When the Washington organizers were experiencing similar 
difficulties, Connerly was able to help them achieve their objectives. Id. 
 50. Steven A. Holmes, Victorious Preference Foes Look for New Battlefields, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
10, 1998, at A25. Unlike California, the measure passed as a statute rather than a constitutional 
amendment because legislative action is required to amend the Washington constitution. Id.; cf. WASH. 
REV. CODE § 49.60.400 (2008) (codifying Initiative 200). 
 51. See Holmes, supra note 50 (observing shortly after Initiative 200 was approved that 
―[w]hichever state Mr. Connerly . . . and his allies decide to make their next target, liberal civil rights 
organizations that favor affirmative action will face a daunting task‖). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The next stop for Connerly was Michigan, where he tapped into the 
controversy surrounding Gratz v. Bollinger
52
 and Grutter v. Bollinger,
53
 
two Supreme Court cases that further defined the permissible bounds of 
affirmative action through challenges to the admissions processes at the 
University of Michigan. Jennifer Gratz herself led the effort with 
assistance from Connerly.
54
 Support for this measure was thought to be 
high because of the tough economic conditions in Michigan, which was 
plagued with ―high unemployment, high migration of young people and a 
wrenching transition away from manufacturing.‖55 The media reported that 
voters who felt that the measure would have a negative economic impact 
for their race in particular would be less supportive of race-conscious 
measures.
56
 Against this backdrop of Supreme Court cases, racial tension, 
and a struggling economy, Proposal 2 passed with 58% of the vote.
57
 
Although this initiative was challenged in federal court, it was ultimately 
upheld.
58
 
 
 
 52. 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan‘s admissions process for 
undergraduates violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
 53. 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (finding that the University of Michigan‘s admissions process for law 
students did not violate the Equal Protection Clause). 
 54. Tamar Lewin, Campaign to End Race Preferences Splits Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 
2006, at A1. Gratz contacted Connerly shortly after the Supreme Court heard her case, and the two of 
them began their multiyear effort to ban affirmative action in Michigan. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. See id. (noting that areas with a high percentage of whites and a ―somber economic picture‖ 
tend to support the ban, while majority black areas oppose the ban). Such an effect might not occur if 
the preferences were based on economics rather than race. See Catherine Rampell, Support Builds For 
A Tax Credit to Help Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A1 (noting that an increasing number of 
policymakers are considering financial assistance to companies that can create jobs in the face of 
economic downturn). Compare Laura D‘Andrea Tyson, Needed: Affirmative Action for the Poor, BUS. 
WK., July 7, 2003, at 24 (indicating that ―two-thirds of Americans support preferences in college 
admissions‖ based on economic background), with Jones, supra note 19 (noting that Americans are 
almost evenly divided on their support of affirmative action). If economic hardship does indeed 
increase support for these kinds of programs, Michigan should have one of the highest levels of 
support. See Susan Saulny, Michigan Lawmakers Face Deadline on Budget Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
29, 2009, at A28 (―Michigan is suffering from a protracted economic downturn that predates the 
national recession.‖). Of course, the more the economy struggles, the more state budgets struggle, 
leaving less money for these programs. Cf. Erik Eckholm, Sharp Reversal For California Over 
Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A1 (describing California‘s budget shortfall‘s negative effects 
on anti-poverty programs). For a more detailed discussion of issues affecting political practicability, 
see infra Part III. 
 57. See Tamar Lewin, Michigan Rejects Affirmative Action, and Backers Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
9, 2006, at P16. Proposition 2 has been codified in Michigan‘s state constitution at article I, section 26. 
 58. See Operation King‘s Dream v. Connerly, No. 06-12773, 2006 WL 2514115, at *1 (E.D. 
Mich. Aug. 29, 2006). Despite his technical compliance with voter fraud laws, the judge criticized 
Connerly in dicta for what he perceived to be unfair tactics in the collection of signatures. Id.; accord 
supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/6
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In 2008, Connerly targeted Nebraska, where a similar ban passed with 
over 57% of the vote.
59
 In response to fraud allegations similar to those 
raised in Michigan, Connerly contended that ―any fraud was isolated and 
shouldn‘t affect the vote.‖60 These fraud-based challenges suffered the 
same fate as the challenges in Michigan
61
 and California
62
 and were 
rejected by the courts.
63
  
Despite his success in Nebraska in 2008, that year also generated 
Connerly‘s first noteworthy failures in his movement to ban affirmative 
action by ballot initiative.
64
 His organization failed to get enough 
signatures in Missouri
65
 and Arizona
66
 to even place the initiative on the 
ballots. Connerly was also handed his first failure at the ballot box in the 
state of Colorado, where the initiative failed by less than a percentage 
point.
67
 But Connerly did not leave these states for dead—he attempted to 
get a similar measure on the Missouri ballot in 2010
68
 and succeeded in 
passing such a ban in Arizona.
69
  
 
 
 59. See Frosch, supra note 28. 
 60. Matthew Hansen, Nebraska Voters Back Affirmative Action Ban, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, 
Nov. 5, 2008, at 14W. 
 61. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
 62. See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
 63. See State ex rel. Hall v. Gale, No. CI08-4055 (Neb. D. Ct. Jan. 22, 2009). The court noted ―in 
passing[] that those who support affirmative action believe that describing Initiative 424 as a ‗civil 
rights‘ initiative is misleading, while those who believe that reverse discrimination is the result of 
affirmative action do not.‖ Id. at n.2.  
 64. See Frosch, supra note 28. 
 65. Kavita Kumar, Affirmative Action Critic Vows He’ll Try Again, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
May 6, 2008, at D1. Connerly attributed this failure to litigation regarding the wording of the ballot 
initiative and vowed to return in 2010. Id. The Missouri Secretary of State had written a description of 
the ballot initiative that a lower court found ―insufficient or unfair.‖ See Asher v. Carnahan, 268 
S.W.3d 427, 429 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing the trial court‘s findings); see also Kumar, supra 
(discussing this challenge and noting that the movement‘s leaders blamed the Secretary of State‘s 
wording and the subsequent challenge for the failure to collect signatures by not leaving them enough 
time). However, the movement‘s challenge to the wording of the ballot initiative was dismissed as 
moot when the signatures were not turned in. See Asher, 268 S.W.3d at 429. 
 66. Group Abandons Lawsuit Over Affirmative Action, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Aug. 31, 
2008, at A11. While the Arizona Civil Rights Initiative challenged the determination of insufficient 
signatures in court, it dropped that challenge due to time constraints and vowed to take the issue up 
again in 2010. Id. 
 67. See Frosch, supra note 28. Polls conducted in the months leading up to the election indicated 
strong support of the measure. Id. Despite these early indications of probable success, Connerly 
downplayed the loss, saying that he was nervous about this state and that the polls showing him with 
an advantage ―made [him] laugh,‖ but he vowed to carry on into other unidentified states. See Kevin 
Flynn, Civil Rights Initiative Defeated: Amendment 46 Would Have Ended Affirmative Action, ROCKY 
MTN. NEWS, Nov. 7, 2008, at 5. 
 68. See MO. SEC‘Y OF STATE, APPROVED BALLOT INITIATIVE 2010–001 (2010), available at 
http://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/2010petitions/2010-001.asp. 
 69. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
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C. Class-Based Affirmative Action 
The need for alternatives to race-based affirmative action became 
increasingly clear as Connerly continued to have success banning race-
based affirmative action across the United States. This Part describes the 
history and theory of class-based affirmative action—one such alternative 
that allows the state to continue using government contracting to further 
socioeconomic policy. 
1. Political Genesis 
Government contracting policies targeting areas of high unemployment 
have existed since the 1950s, when the federal government instituted the 
Labor Surplus Area (LSA) program.
70
 This program established 
preferences to encourage business development in areas of high 
unemployment.
71
 Concerns about the legality of set-asides, the interplay of 
different statutes authorizing different levels of set-asides for different 
programs, the lack of mandatory language, the fact that the program only 
required participants to agree to select subcontractors in line with the 
policy, and a lack of enforcement mechanisms made the LSA program 
―confusing and unclear.‖72 As a result of these failures, the program was 
gutted and effectively discontinued by Congress in 1994.
73
 But President 
Clinton was not ready to completely abandon the program; instead, he 
sought to ―substantially revamp[]‖ it.74  
As the Supreme Court continued to articulate the constitutional limits 
to race-conscious affirmative action,
75
 politicians who supported using 
public contracting as a means of effectuating socioeconomic policy 
generally adopted one of two approaches: (1) comply with the affirmative 
action decisions and look for ―loopholes‖ contained in them, or (2) 
―[r]ethink the reasons for set-aside programs and, mindful of the 
imperative for color-blind policies, implement a different type of 
 
 
 70. See Deirdre Roney, Note, HUBZones: The Class-Based Idea, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J. 933, 938 & 
nn.39–40 (2003) (citing JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH NASH, JR., FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT 
CONTRACTS 628 (1st ed. 1982)).  
 71. Roney, supra note 70, at 938 & nn.39–40. 
 72. See id. (citing CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 70, at 628–31). 
 73. Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 7206(c), 108 Stat. 3243, 3382 (1994); Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 342(d), 
108 Stat. 4809, 4953 (1994); see also Roney, supra note 70, at 938. 
 74. See Michael K. Frisby, Labor-Surplus Preferences Endangered by Clinton’s Affirmative 
Action Review, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1995, at A10. 
 75. See supra notes 23–24 and accompanying text. 
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economic set-aside program.‖76 Both politicians who favored77 and 
politicians who opposed
78
 race-based affirmative action began to consider 
alternative programs out of the LSA mold. This reconsideration 
culminated in the adoption of the Historically Underutilized Business 
Zone (HUBZone) program.
79
 And as ballot initiatives preclude more states 
and municipalities from considering race in crafting affirmative action 
programs,
80
 local legislators are left to consider HUBZone-like proposals 
because the constitutional ―loopholes‖81 that previously permitted the 
consideration of race are now effectively closed.
82
 
2. Theoretical Goals and Concerns 
The political rhetoric that focused on ―replac[ing] group affirmative 
action . . . . rather than . . . wiping out affirmative action by itself‖83 
spawned an academic literature of class-based affirmative action that has 
attempted to set out the underlying theory and goals of such programs.
84
 
Class-based affirmative action plants its moral roots in the furtherance of 
equal opportunity, as ―[c]lass preferences [are designed to] indirectly 
compensate for past discrimination, bring about a natural integration, and 
provide a bridge to a color-blind future.‖85 Because of this equal 
 
 
 76. See Edward I. Koch, Equal Opportunity – Without Minority Set-Asides, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 
1989, at A19. 
 77. President Bill Clinton believed that affirmative action was ―still needed,‖ but contemplated a 
program that would provide a preference to businesses in ―distressed communities‖ regardless of the 
owner‘s race or gender. Michael K. Frisby, Clinton Sees Need for Affirmative-Action Plans but May 
Open Set-Aside Programs to Whites, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1995, at A14. Clinton considered the 
pendency of Adarand in deciding when to release the details of his new program. See Frisby, supra 
note 74.  
 78. Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich framed the issue as preferring to ―talk about how do we 
replace group affirmative action with effective help for individuals, rather than just talk about wiping 
out affirmative action by itself.‖ John F. Harris, President May Appoint Panel to Study Preference 
Programs, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1995, at A1. Gingrich was opposed to the traditional model of 
affirmative action. See Editorial, A New Tack on Affirmative Action: Gingrich Rightly Warns Against 
Using the Issue to Divide Americans, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at B8 (noting that Gingrich opposed 
―racial quotas and set-asides‖). 
 79. See infra Part II.D. 
 80. See supra Part II.B. 
 81. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Harris, supra note 78 (quoting Newt Gingrich). 
 84. Richard D. Kahlenberg has written extensively on the subject, driving its development in the 
legal literature. See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY: CLASS, RACE, AND AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION (1996) [hereinafter KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY]; Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based 
Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037 (1996) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative 
Action].  
 85. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1060. 
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opportunity outlook, class-based affirmative action ―seek[s] to adjust for 
the latent potential of those who have faced obstacles and done fairly well 
nonetheless.‖86 In other words, it seeks to balance the view that a purely 
merit-based distribution results in inequality, because those who lack 
opportunity and education are frequently excluded, against the view that 
the greatest societal benefit is derived when the most qualified applicant is 
selected.
87
  
By attempting to strike this balance, class-based affirmative action 
seeks to redress the damage of relative class inequality, extending its focus 
beyond the damage done to the poorest of the poor.
88
 This distinguishes 
class-based affirmative action from anti-poverty programs, which, as the 
name implies, are primarily intended to mitigate poverty.
89
 Because anti-
poverty programs are paid for out of general funds, the cost is distributed 
among the tax base according to the rate of taxation.
90
 On the other hand, 
merit-based programs like class-based affirmative action 
―characteristically operate within, and supplement or modify the selection 
criteria of, programs or institutions designed to perform socially valued 
functions.‖91 The lion‘s share of the cost of these programs is borne not by 
the taxpayers, but by those who lost the opportunity they would have had 
but for the preference, which may result in a corresponding decrease in the 
quality of the performance.
92
  
One response to this higher-cost/lower-quality criticism is that a 
properly structured preference can lead ―bidders [to] bid more 
aggressively [and] closer to their cost,‖ which allows ―both minority 
representation and cost effectiveness [to] be enhanced simultaneously.‖93 
 
 
 86. Id. at 1061. 
 87. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA 
L. REV. 1913, 1919–20 (1996).  
 88. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1085–86. 
 89. Fallon, supra note 87, at 1918–19. Such programs are not antithetical to class-based 
affirmative action; they simply rest on different justifications. See id. at 1919. 
 90. See id. at 1919.  
 91. Id. at 1918. The meritocracy operating within class-based affirmative action is demonstrated 
by the requirement that its beneficiaries have enjoyed some amount of success in their endeavors 
despite being economically disadvantaged. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.  
 92. Fallon, supra note 87, at 1918–19 (―[B]ecause affirmative action programs involve benefits 
normally distributed according to merit criteria, affirmative action preferences often have the effect of 
denying benefits to potentially identifiable less preferred candidates.‖). Another underlying 
assumption here is that the firms receiving preferences have higher costs because of societal barriers. 
See Allan Corns & Andrew Schotter, Can Affirmative Action Be Cost Effective? An Experimental 
Examination of Price-Preference Auctions, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 293 (1999) (stating the 
assumption that high-cost firms are those that have faced societal barriers such as race). 
 93. See id. Corns and Schotter suggest that a 5% preference produces this result and that higher 
preferences ―could increase [the] average price of purchasing and fail to reap the benefits that such 
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If the bidder that would have prevailed but for the preferences receives the 
bid regardless, the quality of the work will presumably be the same with a 
lower cost to the government.
94
 But, if a preferred firm that would not 
have won without the preference wins because of the preference, the 
quality of performance may be decreased.
95
 If the cost efficiency of 
bidding does in fact increase under such a program,
96
 the increased cost 
effectiveness could be perceived as offsetting the drop in quality that may 
result.  
Another response focuses on the broader function of government, 
recognizing that the state plays an active role in promoting equality and 
incentivizing economic development though social programs.
97
 Here, the 
argument goes, the added benefit of promoting the goals underlying social 
programs that comes with a class-based affirmative action program should 
be seen as a cost savings to the state in its role as social program provider, 
which may in turn justify a corresponding decrease in contractor quality 
suffered by the state in its role as consumer.
98
 This response is in line with 
the prevailing legal understanding of public contracting, which allows 
governments to define by legislation what they seek from bidders, both in 
terms of quality of performance and hiring standards.
99
  
 
 
price-preferences rules offer.‖ Id. 
 94. If cost is correlated to merit, as suggested supra by note 92 and its accompanying text, there 
should be no reduction in the quality of performance when the bidder who would have prevailed based 
solely on merit prevails under a preference regime. 
 95. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 96. This is not a forgone conclusion, as some scholars have suggested that lower participation 
rates by large firms may in fact hurt cost efficiency. See Justin Marion, Are Bid Preferences Benign? 
The Effect of Small Business Subsidies in Highway Procurement Auctions, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 1591, 
1593 (2007); see also Fallon, supra note 87, at 1918–19 (―A visible compromise of the commitment to 
merit-based distribution and a corresponding decline in efficiency or excellence may also exist [under 
affirmative action programs].‖). 
 97. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 84, at 179–80 (arguing that such preferences are 
less expensive than anti-poverty programs and are more effectively focused on the evil that is sought 
to be remedied). 
 98. See Tomer Blumkin, Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, Incorporating Affirmative Action 
Into the Welfare State, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 1027, 1027–28, 1032 (2009) (advocating for a reduced focus 
on race by envisioning affirmative action as a way of ―supplementing the redistributive tax-transfer 
system,‖ rather than ―merely as a tool designed to redistribute across population groups,‖ and arguing 
that ―once affirmative action policy is in place[] the tax-transfer system is redundant . . . leaving no 
redistributive role for the tax-and-transfer system‖); cf. KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 84, at 
179 (alluding to interaction of the ―continuing conundrum of welfare‖ and class preferences in the 
education context).  
 99. See supra note 12 (discussing legislative and judicial approaches to bidding requirements); 
cf. Jimmy Chan & Erik Eyster, Does Banning Affirmative Action Lower College Student Quality?, 93 
AM. ECON. REV. 858, 858 (2003) (arguing that affirmative action does not necessarily decrease the 
quality of students admitted to universities when one considers the larger role of universities and their 
ability to define what they seek in a student as a part of quality).  
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Another moral justification for class-based affirmative action is that it 
avoids the anomalous situation observed with race-based affirmative 
action whereby benefits go to the minorities who are in many ways more 
privileged than the people to whom they are being preferred.
100
 The 
genesis of this incongruity is metaphorically represented by race-based 
affirmative action advantaging Bill Cosby‘s children over children of other 
races who have faced ―very real class-based obstacles.‖101 Under a 
program of class-based affirmative action, the preferences would be 
distributed based on need, so the perceived inequality resulting from the 
consideration of race would be eliminated.
102
 The inescapable corollary is 
that class-based affirmative action is not a perfect substitute for race-based 
affirmative action.
103
 Nevertheless, the theory of class-based affirmative 
action remains attractive because it focuses on social utility and barriers to 
equal opportunity rather than a historical proxy for economic 
disadvantage.
104
 Of course, to the extent that race is a barrier to equal 
opportunity for an individual, it will be taken into account under such a 
class-based program because race will likely have resulted in diminished 
class status.
105
 
But one of the most significant criticisms of class-based affirmative 
action is that, because it focuses on merit, it is ―inherently limited by its 
aspiration to confer opportunities only on those who can be expected to 
meet competitive performance standards.‖106 Known as the principles of 
 
 
 100. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1061 & n.133 (citing 
MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN GENERATION 168 (1995)).  
 101. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1061 & n.133. 
 102. See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1947; see also Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based 
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 452, 465 (1997) (noting that minorities are called minorities 
because there are less of them and that ―[m]ost of the poverty based affirmative action slots will go to 
whites, by simple force of numbers‖). 
 103. See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1947. 
 104. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 84, at 178 (arguing that this reality will result in 
less opposition than race-based programs because class-based programs ―moot the entire question of 
intergenerational justice‖); Fallon, supra note 87, at 1948–49 (noting that the partial ―ameliorating 
effects of economically based affirmative action [on race are] a significant additional consideration 
supporting such programs‖ for those who continue to advocate for race-based affirmative action); see 
also Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1062 (citing MARTIN LUTHER 
KING, JR., WHY WE CAN‘T WAIT 147, 152 (1963) for the proposition that Dr. King thought that 
America should focus not only on blacks, who ―entered at the starting line in a [figurative] race three 
hundred years after‖ whites, but also on the ―large stratum of the forgotten white poor‖).  
 105. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 84, at 101–02 (noting that ―classed-based 
preferences implicitly compensate[] those groups that have been historic victims of discrimination by 
addressing the ongoing legacy of discrimination‖); see also Fallon, supra note 87, at 1948–49 (noting 
that class-based affirmative action will have at least some ―ameliorating effects‖ that race-based 
programs seek to address). 
 106. See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1935.  
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the ―top of the bottom‖ and the ―close swap,‖ the basic critique is that 
affirmative action only helps the best qualified among the group 
advantaged by the program, meaning the least qualified among the 
otherwise qualified group are the most likely to suffer.
107
 
Politically, these programs are attractive because they ―decrease public 
consciousness of race and increase public consciousness of class.‖108 This, 
in effect, decreases the social costs under the aforementioned balancing 
framework by eliminating the use of race, which is an extremely divisive 
issue.
109
 Another political consideration weighing in favor of class-based 
programs is that they are cheaper than full-scale anti-poverty programs.
110
 
Legally, the attraction to such programs is that, unlike many race-based 
programs, they are less likely to be held unconstitutional.
111
  
Three guiding principles should be considered in establishing a class-
based preference.
112
 The first is to provide ―genuine equality of 
opportunity, where natural talents may flourish to their full potential.‖113 
 
 
 107. See Malamud, supra note 102, at 458; see also Fallon, supra note 87, at 1918–19 (noting that 
affirmative action ―den[ies] benefits to potentially identifiable less preferred candidates‖). These 
criticisms are the logical consequences of two other criticisms: the principle of least cost and the 
principle of the return of the repressed. Malamud, supra note 102, at 458. The principle of least cost 
recognizes that ―affirmative action programs tend to be designed to increase the representation of the 
target group at the minimum cost to the institution‘s other stated goals and values.‖ Id. at 455. The 
principle of the return of the repressed assumes that ―the designers of programs will aim for simplicity 
and will therefore leave much of what in fact constitutes economic disadvantage unaccounted for‖ 
because ―it is impossible—or at least highly impracticable—to measure each and every socioeconomic 
variable that might affect students‘ performance on traditional entry criteria.‖ Id. at 457–58. 
 108. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1063. 
 109. See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1949; see also supra notes 17–19, 56 and accompanying text 
(discussing divisive nature of racial preferences). 
 110. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 84, at 179. 
 111. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1064 (citing City of 
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989); id. at 526–28 (Scalia, J., concurring)); see 
also 488 U.S. at 509–10 (O‘Connor, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (noting that ―financial 
aid for disadvantaged entrepreneurs of all races would open the public contracting market to all those 
who have suffered the effects of past societal discrimination or neglect‖ and is accordingly permissible 
―[e]ven in the absence of evidence of discrimination‖); id. at 526–28 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting 
that local governments can adopt preferences for small or new businesses that ―may well have racially 
disproportionate impact, but [that] are not based on race‖ without triggering strict scrutiny). This also 
comports with the Supreme Court‘s recent suggestion that ―[t]he way to stop discrimination on the 
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.‖ See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). Using geography in this calculus also appears 
constitutional. Cf. id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(explaining that school district boundaries drawn with recognition of racial segregation can comply 
with the Equal Protection Principle); Pyke v. Cuomo, 567 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2009) (indicating that 
geographical classifications that are not ―insidious proxies for suspect racial classifications‖ are not 
suspect classifications); St. John‘s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 
2007) (holding that geography is not a suspect classification). 
 112. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1066. 
 113. Id. 
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The point is to reward people who have ―faced serious obstacles and been 
relatively successful anyway.‖114 The ideal program would apply at 
―‗meritocratic crisis points‘ relatively early in life.‖115 In the realm of 
public contracting, ―race-neutral class-based preferences can . . . be framed 
to give a leg up in contracting to those companies headed by individuals 
who are disadvantaged relative to the competition, and/or companies that 
employ workers who are disadvantaged and are located in disadvantaged 
census tracts.‖116 
Moreover, the program should be administrable.
117
 The emphasis is on 
verifiable information, objective criteria, and stiff fraud penalties to deter 
potential abusers.
118
 Although deciding upon what objectively verifiable 
measures get at class and how to take them into account is a complex and 
difficult task,
119
 similar problems exist in both race-based affirmative 
action and other social programs.
120
 
Finally, the system should be ―politically palatable,‖ meaning that it 
―can actually be adopted in our nation‘s republican form of 
government.‖121 While race-based remedies have been imposed by the 
Supreme Court where constitutional violations have been found, it is 
unlikely that similar remedies will be imposed on the basis of class.
122
  
 
 
 114. Id.; accord Fallon, supra note 87, at 1921 (arguing that ―powerful, equality based arguments 
hold that, other things being equal, those born with relatively less talent should be given more 
opportunities, not fewer, than those who are better endowed by the natural lottery‖). 
 115. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1067 (emphasis omitted); see 
also Fallon, supra note 87, at 1927 (noting that ―many of the disadvantaging conditions associated 
with poverty specifically involve childhood poverty, not present economic status‖). 
 116. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1071. Kahlenberg discusses a 
location-based program that New York City used for a short period and the genesis of the HUBZone 
program out of proposals by President Clinton and Senator Christopher Bond. See id. at 1072–73; see 
also infra Part II.D.1 (providing further discussion). 
 117. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1066; see also Fallon, supra 
note 87, at 1927–28 (noting that class-based affirmative action programs may suffer from ―large 
problems of definition and administration‖). 
 118. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1066. 
 119. This difficulty may be a significant roadblock to achieving the goals of such programs. See 
supra note 107 (discussing the ―return of the repressed‖ concept). This informs the recommendations 
made in Part III, infra. 
 120. See KAHLENBERG, THE REMEDY, supra note 84, at 139 (discussing line-drawing problems 
with race-based affirmative action and problems of administration associated with ―student loans, food 
stamps, social security,‖ and ―any number of existing programs‖).  
 121. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1066. 
 122. Id. ―[I]t is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of 
a constitutional violation.‖ Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971). The 
―central meaning‖ of the Fourteenth Amendment is to prevent the government from engaging in 
invidious racial classifications. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). But classifications in 
traditional social welfare programs are generally far less suspect. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 
749, 770 (1975) (noting that classifications in social welfare statutes normally receive rational basis 
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D. Existing Class-Based Contracting Programs Focusing on 
Disadvantaged Areas 
1. Programs 
The most prominent existing program steering government contracts to 
businesses located in and employing residents of disadvantaged areas is 
HUBZone, administered by the federal government‘s Small Business 
Administration.
123
 Although President Clinton considered the ―place-not-
race concept‖124 as one way to restructure federal government contracting 
programs,
125
 the program finally adopted by Congress was authored by 
Republican Senator Christopher Bond of Missouri.
126
 The stated purpose 
of the program is ―to provide federal contracting assistance for qualified 
[small businesses] located in historically underutilized business zones in 
an effort to increase employment opportunities, investment, and economic 
development in such areas.‖127 In general terms, the program authorizes 
sole-source procurements, set-asides for restricted competition, and price 
preferences after full and open competition to businesses with their 
principal offices in HUBZones, which are owned and controlled by United 
States citizens, and which employ at least 35% of their labor force from 
HUBZones.
128
 
The state of California maintains the Target Area Contract Preference 
Act (TACPA) program with similar goals of  
encourag[ing] and facilitat[ing] job maintenance and job 
development in distressed and declining areas of cities and towns in 
the state . . . . by providing appropriate preferences to California 
based companies submitting bids or proposals for state contracts to 
be performed at worksites in distressed areas by persons with a high 
 
 
review); St. John‘s United Church of Christ v. City of Chi., 502 F.3d 616, 638 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding 
that geography is not a suspect classification). Therefore, courts are unlikely to order this type of 
program since it is unlikely that any constitutional violation would exist that would justify such a 
program as a remedy. 
 123. See 15 U.S.C. § 657a (2006) (establishing HUBZone program under Small Business 
Administration and defining eligible contracts). 
 124. See Paul M. Barrett & Michael K. Frisby, ―Place, Not Race‖ Could Be Next Catch Phrase in 
Government’s Affirmative-Action Programs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 1995, at B16. 
 125. Roney, supra note 70, at 939 (citing Exec. Order No. 13,005, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,069 (May 21, 
1996)). This continued the tradition of many affirmative action programs beginning with executive 
orders. See supra note 14.  
 126. See Roney, supra note 70, at 940. 
 127. 13 C.F.R. § 126.100 (2006). 
 128. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.200 (2006). There are a variety of alternate ways to qualify for the 
program. These and other aspects of the program are discussed more fully in Part II.D.2. 
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risk of unemployment when the contract is for goods or services in 
excess of one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000).
129
  
The state of Minnesota also maintains a program to provide contract 
preferences to businesses located in economically disadvantaged areas 
(EDA).
130
  
Despite their similar goals, these programs operate in different ways. 
As the general philosophy underlying HUBZone, TACPA, and EDA 
continues to become more attractive to legislators who are facing 
constitutional restraints on their ability to target government contracting to 
businesses based on race and gender,
131
 a more complete understanding of 
these existing programs is merited.
132
 The following section undertakes 
such an analysis. 
2. Analysis of Program Requirements
133
 
a. Ownership and Control 
A feature common to all three programs is a requirement that the 
ownership of any business receiving a preference be either connected to 
the United States or the territory of the relevant local government. 
HUBZone and EDA approach ownership in fairly similar ways: at least 
51% of the enterprise must be owned by people with specific immigration 
statuses in the United States.
134
 This 51% requirement can be met only by 
 
 
 129. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4531 (West 2008). 
 130. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7) (2004).  
 131. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (noting lawmaker concerns); see also supra Part 
II.B (describing state-by-state anti–affirmative action movement). 
 132. Cf. Memorandum, supra note 6, at 1 (noting interest of incoming state representative in 
Wyoming, a state that does not have an affirmative-action ban, in whether any states have programs 
similar to HUBZone and concluding that various programs not analyzed in this Note are similar ―in 
name only‖). Little scholarly attention has been paid to any of these three programs. However, two 
student-authored pieces have examined certain aspects of the HUBZone program. See Kendall L. 
Miller, Comment, HUBZones: Moving from the Racial Battleground to the Economic Common 
Ground, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 367 (1999); Roney, supra note 70. TACPA and EDA 
appear to have received even less attention. 
 133. Although the defining characteristics of these programs are fairly obvious on the face of the 
relevant statutes and regulations, the general delineation of requirements used in Miller, supra note 
132, and Roney, supra note 70, in discussing HUBZone is followed in this subpart for the purposes of 
comparing HUBZone with TACPA and EDA.  
 134. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.200 (2006); MINN. R. 1230.0150 (2008). Although HUBZone now only 
requires 51% ownership, see 13 C.F.R. § 126.200, as originally conceived it required the entire 
business to be owned by U.S. citizens, see Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-135, § 602(a)(3)(A), 111 Stat. 2592, 2627 (requiring ownership by ―1 or more persons, each of 
whom is a United States citizen‖). This requirement was later relaxed. See Consolidated 
Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. 108-447, § 151(a)(1)(A), 118 Stat. 2809, 3456 (2004). 
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citizens under HUBZone,
135
 while EDA is somewhat more inclusive, 
counting lawfully admitted permanent residents toward the requirement in 
addition to citizens.
136
  
TACPA approaches ownership in a markedly different way, providing 
two ways to be certified as a ―California based company,‖ which is a 
threshold to certification.
137
 The domicile method of certification is more 
similar to HUBZone and EDA, requiring, among other conditions 
discussed below, that the owners of the business be domiciled in 
California.
138
 The harshness of the requirement that all owners live in 
California is somewhat mitigated by the alternative connection method of 
certification: 
ha[ving] a major office or manufacturing facility located in 
California and [having] been licensed by the state on a continuous 
basis to conduct business within the state and ha[ving] continuously 
employed California residents for work within the state during the 
three years prior to submitting a bid or proposal for a state 
contract.
139
  
Therefore, under TACPA, ownership is merely one element of one method 
of showing the required relationship with the state of California.  
A closely related requirement that all three programs impose to some 
degree is that control of the business must be in the hands of people who 
would satisfy the ownership requirements. As such, under HUBZone, 51% 
of the people who control the business must be U.S. citizens;
140
 under 
 
 
 135. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.200(b)(1)(i) (requiring that 51% of the business be ―unconditionally and 
directly owned . . . by persons who are United States citizens‖). Ownership, under HUBZone, is any 
legal or equitable interest and is determined on a person-by-person basis; it includes shareholders, 
beneficiaries, trustees, holders of stock options, partners, and members, as applicable depending on the 
form of business association at issue. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.201 (2006). Ownership under HUBZone can 
also be satisfied by Indian Tribal Governments, see 13 C.F.R. § 126.200(a), and certain small 
agricultural cooperatives, see 13 C.F.R. § 126.200(c).  
 136. See MINN. R. 1230.0150(26). Under EDA, ownership must be ―real, substantial, and 
continuing, and must go beyond the pro forma ownership of the firm as reflected in its ownership 
documents.‖ MINN. R. 1230.1700(5a)(B). This is determined by looking to the substance of the 
arrangement, not the form of organization. Id. 
 137. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(h) (West 2008) (defining California based company). To 
receive any preference under TACPA, the business must be a California based company. See CAL. 
GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533–4534.1 (West 2008). 
 138. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(h)(1).  
 139. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(h)(2).  
 140. 13 C.F.R. § 126.200(b)(1)(i). Control relates to ―both the day-to-day management and long-
term decision-making authority for the HUBZone SBC.‖ 13 C.F.R. § 126.202. Those with control 
include officers, directors, general partners, managing partners, managing members, managers, and, on 
a case-by-case basis, ―key employees who possess expertise or responsibilities related to the concern‘s 
primary economic activity.‖ Id. 
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EDA, a majority of the control must be in the hands of U.S. citizens or 
lawfully admitted permanent residents;
141
 and under TACPA, control is 
effectively a requirement under the domicile method of being a California 
based company because TACPA requires that the owners of 
unincorporated businesses and the officers of corporations be domiciled in 
California.
142
 
b. Qualified Areas and Connection Thereto 
A defining feature of each of these ―place-not-race‖ programs is that 
businesses seeking the preferences must have some specified presence in a 
particular type of blighted area, defined alternatively as historically 
underutilized business zones,
143
 distressed areas,
144
 or economically 
disadvantaged areas.
145
 The required level of connection to the blighted 
area varies quite significantly between the three programs. HUBZone‘s 
presence requirement is the most stringent, requiring that the business‘s 
principal office be located in the HUBZone.
146
 While a business does not 
lose its eligibility merely because one or more offices are located outside 
of a HUBZone,
147
 to be eligible, ―the location where the greatest number 
of the concern‘s employees at any one location perform their work‖ must 
be in a HUBZone.
148
 TACPA is far more permissive in two critical 
 
 
 141. See MINN. R. 1230.0150 (requiring control be in the hands of described U.S. persons). Under 
EDA, control means ―operationally controlled on a day-to-day basis.‖ MINN. R. 1230.0150. 
Referencing day-to-day, while not referencing long-term, decision making suggests that this control 
requirement is narrower than HUBZone‘s. See supra note 140 (discussing requirement under 
HUBZone that both long-run and short-run control be in citizens‘ hands).  
 142. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(h)(1) (West 2008). Because officers control corporations on a 
day-to-day basis, this is in substance a control requirement. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 312 (West 2008); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142 (2001); see also BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1193 (9th ed. 2009) 
(officer: ―a person elected or appointed by the board of directors to manage the daily operations of a 
corporation, such as a CEO, president, secretary, or treasurer‖). Because other forms of business 
associations do not divide management and ownership, the requirement of ownership is also in 
substance a control requirement when applied to noncorporate businesses. Compare 18 AM. JUR. 2D 
Corporations § 44 (2004) (discussing separation of ownership and control in corporation), with 
BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra, at 1520 (sole proprietorship: ―[a] business in which one person 
owns all the assets, owes all the liabilities, and operates in his or her personal capacity‖). 
 143. See 15 U.S.C. § 657a(a) (2006) (referencing ―HUBZones‖). 
 144. CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4531–4532. 
 145. MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7) (2009). 
 146. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.200 (2006). 
 147. 13 C.F.R. § 126.207 (2006). 
 148. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103 (2006). This requirement is relaxed for business in the service or 
construction industries by excluding ―the concern‘s employees who perform the majority of their work 
at job-site locations to fulfill specific contract obligations‖ from the calculation. Id. In making this 
determination, an ―employee‖ is defined as a person (or specific combination of persons) employed on 
a full-time, permanent basis. Id. There are two types of full-time employees: those who work thirty or 
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respects. First, neither method of being deemed a California based 
company requires that the principal office be in a distressed area, just that 
the business have a ―major office or manufacturing facility located in 
California‖ under the connection method149 or that the ―principal office is 
located in California‖ under the domicile method.150 The second 
distinction provides most of the substance of the connection requirement; 
under TACPA, the relevant ―worksite‖ must be in a distressed area.151 This 
allows businesses with principal offices outside the distressed area to be 
eligible for TACPA preferences provided the work to be done under the 
contract is in the distressed area or is sufficiently close to one that the 
statute treats it as distressed.
152
 The connection requirement in EDA is 
only slightly more demanding than that of TACPA, requiring that the 
principal office be in Minnesota
153
 and that the business be located in, or 
that the business‘s owner reside in, an economically disadvantaged area.154 
EDA is notable for creating a preference based not only on where the 
business is located, but also based on where its owner resides.
155
 
Moreover, each program specifies both the relevant units of geography 
and the required level of economic disadvantage therein as a threshold 
requirement for certification. Geographically, although TACPA is limited 
 
 
more hours per week, and a fictional full-time employee for each aggregation of employees who work 
less than thirty hours per week but whose total hours worked add up to forty. Id. Temporary and leased 
employees do not count in this determination. Id. 
 149. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(h)(2) (West 2008).  
 150. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(h)(1). 
 151. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533–4534.1 (West 2008) (imposing the worksite requirement). A 
worksite is either ―[a] business located within a distressed area,‖ § 4532(i)(1), or ―[a] business located 
in directly adjoining census tract blocks that when attached to the distressed area forms a contiguous 
boundary,‖ § 4532(i)(2). For a discussion of census tract blocks, see infra note 157 and accompanying 
text. 
 152. See supra note 151.  
 153. MINN. R. 1230.1700 (2009). A principal office is ―the primary physical location at which or 
from which a business performs, is maintained, or operates.‖ MINN. R. 1230.0150 (2009). This 
requirement appears in a regulation, not in the statute, and is essentially imposed by negative 
implication. Section 1230.1700 applies to all programs created by Minnesota Statutes section 16C.16. 
See MINN. R. 1230.1700(1) (2009). Those programs include small business preferences, targeted group 
purchasing, veteran-owned small business preferences and, at issue here, preferences for economically 
disadvantaged areas. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16 (2009). By the terms of the statute, only the small 
business preference requires that the ―principal place of business be in Minnesota.‖ See id. 
§ 16C.16(2). However, the regulation allows the Department of Administration to reject an application 
to any of these programs, including EDA, if ―the applicant‘s principal place of business is not in 
Minnesota.‖ See MINN. R. 1230.1700(5)(G). 
 154. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(c). A business can also satisfy this connection requirement if it 
is ―a certified rehabilitation facility or extended employment provider.‖ MINN. STAT. 
§ 16C.16(7)(c)(3). These alternate means of certification are discussed more fully below. See infra 
notes 182–83 and accompanying text. 
 155. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(c)(1). 
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to urban areas,
156
 it takes the most nuanced approach to identifying 
blighted areas by focusing on very small geographic units known as block 
groups.
157
 HUBZone applies in both rural
158
 and urban
159
 areas, but the 
relevant geographical classification for rural areas is the county, while the 
relevant geographical classification for urban areas is the census tract.
160
 
This can result in ―discrepancies in eligibility between poor metropolitan 
counties and adjacent non-metropolitan counties.‖161 EDA generally 
focuses only on civil jurisdictions such as cities and counties,
162
 although 
it also vests the state‘s commissioner of administration with the authority 
to designate certain neighborhoods and other areas as economically 
distressed if it ―would further the purposes of the‖ program.163 To illustrate 
the import of the varying units of analysis employed under these 
programs, there are approximately 7,020,924 census block groups;
164
 
62,276 census tracts;
165
 3068 counties and county equivalents;
166
 and 
 
 
 156. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533–4534.1 (West 2008) (limiting to distressed areas); see also 
CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532 (West 2008) (defining distressed area, in operative part, as ―a central city or 
cities and surrounding closely settled territory‖). 
 157. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(a) (defining block groups); § 4532(c) (defining ―cluster of 
block groups‖ as ―one or more contiguous block groups‖). A cluster must contain at least 3000 people 
to be eligible for the preference. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(d) (imposing population requirement). 
 158. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103 (2006) (defining HUBZone to include ―[q]ualified non-metropolitan 
counties‖). 
 159. Id. (defining HUBZone to include ―[q]ualified census tracts‖); see also 26 U.S.C. 
§ 42(d)(5)(C)(ii) (2006) (defining ―qualified census tract‖ differently depending on location in 
metropolitan statistical area or nonmetropolitan area). 
 160. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103.  
 161. See HENRY BEALE & NICOLA DEAS, MICROECONOMIC APPLICATIONS, INC., THE HUBZONE 
PROGRAM REPORT 228 (2008), available at http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs325tot.pdf.  
 162. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(c)(1)–(2) (2004). These two sections, read together, provide 
this limitation. Section 16C.16(7)(c)(1) focuses on counties alone, while section 16C.16(7)(c)(2) 
focuses on labor surplus areas as designated by the U.S. Department of Labor. ―Labor surplus areas are 
classified on the basis of civil jurisdictions,‖ which are defined as ―all cities with a population of at 
least 25,000[,] all counties,‖ and, in Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania, 
―[t]ownships with a population of 25,000 or more.‖ See Emp‘t & Training Admin., Description of 
Labor Surplus Area, U.S. DEP‘T OF LABOR, http://www.doleta.gov/Programs/laborsurplus02.cfm (last 
updated Jan. 7, 2010). Thus, this program focuses on counties and cities alone. 
 163. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(d). 
 164. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Census Blocks and Block Groups, in GEOGRAPHIC AREAS 
REFERENCE MANUAL 11-1, 11-1 (1994), available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/Ch11 
GARM.pdf. These units are ―the smallest geographic area for which the Bureau of the Census collects 
and tabulates decennial census data.‖ Id. 
 165. This is the sum of the number of block numbering areas and census tracts in 1990. See U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, Census Tracts and Block Numbering Areas, in GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE 
MANUAL 12-1, 12-1 (1994), available at http://www.census.gov/geo/www/GARM/Ch10GARM.pdf. 
They have been combined because block numbering areas are now census tracts. See U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, GEOGRAPHIC AREAS REFERENCE MANUAL (1994), available at http://www.census.gov/geo/ 
www/garm.html. 
 166. See Overview of County Government, NAT‘L ASS‘N OF CNTYS., http://www.naco.org/ 
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39,044 cities, towns, and townships
167
 in the United States. As an extreme 
example, there are about 2,288 times more block groups than counties;
168
 
so a TACPA-like focus on block groups is more likely, at least in theory, 
to identify isolated pockets of poverty than is an EDA-like focus on 
counties.
169
 In that respect, holding all else equal, TACPA seems to be the 
best equipped to identify areas that are distressed despite their proximity to 
nondistressed areas.
170
 
The socioeconomic considerations that the areas described above must 
meet in order to be eligible are even more varied than the approaches 
taken to isolate the areas geographically. TACPA makes up for its liberal 
approach to isolating geographic areas by its strict approach to 
determining what makes those areas distressed.
171
 In order to qualify under 
TACPA, a cluster of block groups must satisfy five of the eight criteria 
specified under the statute.
172
 Seven of these criteria focus on whether the 
block group is within the upper quartile of all block groups with respect to  
[t]he percentage of the block group‘s population over age 25 with 
less than a high school education . . .[,] [t]he unemployment rate of 
the block group . . .[,] [t]he percentage of the block group‘s 
households which were female-headed households in poverty with 
children present . . .[,] [t]he percentage of the block group‘s 
population over 65 who were in poverty . . .[,] [t]he percentage of 
the block group‘s households with more than 1.01 persons per room 
. . .[,] [t]he percentage of the block group‘s population younger than 
 
 
Counties/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited May 1, 2011) (noting that there are 3028 counties and 40 
city-county governments in the United States). 
 167. See Number of Local Governments & Population Distribution, NAT‘L LEAGUE OF CITIES, 
http://www.nlc.org/build-skills-networks/resources/cities-101/number-of-local-governments--populati 
on-distribution (last visited May 1, 2011).  
 168. This calculation is based on the numbers in notes 164 and 166 and accompanying text.  
 169. Cf. John Iceland & Erika Steinmetz, The Effects of Using Census Block Groups Instead of 
Census Tracts When Examining Residential Housing Patterns, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 4 (2003), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/pdf/unit_of_analysis.pdf 
(comparing use of census tracts and census block groups in study of residential housing patterns and 
finding that relative clustering indices are nearly twice as high at the block group level than the tract 
level). 
 170. See id.; cf. BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 228 (describing related phenomenon under 
HUBZone whereby metropolitan counties are considered at the census tract level but nonmetropolitan 
counties are considered at the county level, resulting in certain metropolitan counties that would 
qualify if examined at the county level having large areas within them that do not qualify because the 
most severe poverty is contained in few census tracts). 
 171. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(d) (West 2008). 
 172. See id. 
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18 who were in poverty . . .[, or] [t]he percentage of the block 
group‘s population who were nonwhite or hispanic [sic].173  
The final criterion focuses on whether the block group is within the lower 
quartile of all block groups with respect to per capita income.
174
 
Both HUBZone and EDA emphasize some combination of 
unemployment,
175
 poverty,
176
 and income.
177
 While TACPA focuses on 
these measures alone in two of the eight considerations,
178
 and in 
conjunction with other measures in three more,
179
 its conjunctive quartile 
approach has the potential to be highly arbitrary in the areas it excludes; 
being one percentage point off on four of the measures while highly 
disadvantaged on the remaining measures will result in complete 
exclusion.
180
  
In addition to the standard method of defining geographical boundaries 
and corresponding socioeconomic statuses, HUBZone and EDA have 
 
 
 173. See id. The intersection between the race and gender considerations in TACPA and article I, 
section 31(a) of the California constitution, which provides that ―[t]he State shall not discriminate 
against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public 
contracting,‖ appears to have never been litigated. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103 (2006) (providing that nonmetropolitan counties qualify as 
HUBZones if ―[t]he unemployment rate is not less than 140 percent of the average unemployment rate 
for the United States or for the State in which such county is located, whichever is less‖); MINN. STAT. 
§ 16C.16(7)(c)(2) (2004) (declaring labor surplus areas, as defined by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
to be economically disadvantaged). A labor surplus area is a civil jurisdiction whose  
average unemployment rate was at least 20 percent above the average unemployment rate for 
all states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico during the previous two calendar years. 
During periods of high national unemployment, the 1.20 percent ratio is disregarded and an 
area is classified as a labor surplus area if its unemployment rate during the previous two 
calendar years was 10 percent or more. 
See Emp‘t & Training Admin., supra note 162. 
 176. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103 (defining qualified census tract for HUBZone purposes by reference 
to 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (2006) (providing 25% poverty rate as alternative measure when 
income statistics not available for a census tract)). 
 177. See 26 U.S.C. § 42(d)(5)(C)(ii)(I) (defining qualified census tracts for HUBZone purposes as 
those in ―which 50 percent or more of the households have an income which is less than 60 percent of 
the area median gross income‖); 13 C.F.R. § 126.103 (defining qualified nonmetropolitan counties for 
HUBZone purposes as those in which ―[t]he median household income is less than 80% of the non-
metropolitan State median household income‖); MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(c)(1) (2004) (providing that 
economically disadvantaged areas for EDA purposes include ―count[ies] in which the median income 
for married couples is less than 70 percent of the state median income for married couples‖). 
 178. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(d)(2) (West 2008) (unemployment); § 4532(d)(3) (per capita 
income). 
 179. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(d)(4) (female-headed households with children present in 
poverty); § 4532(d)(5) (population over sixty-five in poverty); § 4532(d)(7) (population younger than 
eighteen in poverty).  
 180. See supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/6
  
 
 
 
 
2011] REVISITING CLASS-BASED AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 1333 
 
 
 
 
alternative ways of satisfying the sociogeographic requirement. HUBZone 
treats lands within the external boundaries of Indian reservations and 
qualified base closure areas as sufficiently disadvantaged to merit 
inclusion.
181
 The statute creating the EDA program provides that ―[a] 
business is located in an economically disadvantaged area if . . . the 
business is a certified rehabilitation facility or extended employment 
provider.‖182 Although it seems somewhat irrational to conclude that a 
business is located in a qualifying area based solely on the type of business 
it conducts, this structure essentially provides the same preferences 
provided by the EDA program to governmental bodies and nonprofit 
organizations that help those with severe disabilities find work.
183
 This is 
not unlike programs at the state and federal level granting similar 
preferences to people with disabilities related to military service; it is 
simply couched within a program that purports to be based on 
geography.
184
  
c. Methods 
Knowing who must own and control the business and in what type of 
area the business must be located to qualify, the issue becomes what 
benefits the statutory program bestows upon the business; that is, what 
methods have been chosen to advantage the qualifying businesses? The 
one method common to the three programs is price preferences after full 
and open competition.
185
 A price preference adds a specified amount to 
 
 
 181. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103 (2006). Section 126.103 also provides for certification of 
―redesignated areas,‖ which are ―census tract[s and] non-metropolitan count[ies] that cease[] to be . . . 
qualified HUBZone[s]‖ provided certain other conditions are met. Id. Redesignated areas are in 
substance an extension of certification for other previously certified areas. See BEALE & DEAS, supra 
note 161, at 133. 
 182. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(c)(3). 
 183. See MINN. STAT. § 268A.01(6) (2004) (defining rehabilitation facility as ―an entity which is 
operated for the primary purpose of providing or facilitating employment for persons with a severe 
disability‖); MINN. STAT. § 268A.15(2) (declaring purpose of extended employment program to 
provide employment services to those with disabilities).  
 184. Cf. 38 U.S.C. § 8127(a)(1)(B) (2006) (establishing contracting goals for ―veterans with 
service-connected disabilities‖); CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 7084 (West 2008) (establishing Enterprise Zone 
Act, which mirrors TACPA but focuses instead on ―enterprise zone[s]‖); CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 7118 
(West 2008) (establishing Local Agency Military Base Recovery Act, which mirrors TACPA but 
focuses instead on ―local agency military base recovery area[s]‖); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 999.2(a) 
(West 2008) (establishing contracting goal for participation by disabled veteran businesses); see also 
MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(6a)(a)(2) (establishing contracting preference for ―veterans with service-
connected disabilities‖ and tying preference amount under this program to, inter alia, the amount of 
EDA preference). 
 185. See 15 U.S.C. § 657a(b)(3)(A) (2006) (establishing HUBZone preference); CAL. GOV‘T 
CODE §§ 4533–4534.1 (West 2008) (establishing TACPA preferences); MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7) 
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nonpreferred bids for the purpose of determining which bid is lowest.
186
 
HUBZone provides for the greatest price preference at 10%, which is the 
absolute maximum under the program.
187
 EDA has similarly absolute 
preferences, although the absolute preference itself varies based on the 
industry in question: construction contracts receive a 4% preference, while 
contracts relating to all other industries receive a 6% preference.
188
  
TACPA takes a noticeably different approach to preferences. First, 
TACPA requires that 90% of the labor hours under a service contract be 
performed in the designated area to receive a preference in a service 
contract, while only 50% of such hours need be conducted in such an area 
under a goods contract.
189
 Next, and more distinctively, TACPA provides 
for a varying preference based on the percentage of the business‘s 
employees who are at high risk of unemployment.
190
 In effect, the 
minimum available preference under TACPA is 5%,
191
 while the 
maximum is 9%,
192
 meaning that in no event will it provide a greater 
 
 
(2004) (establishing EDA preferences). 
 186. See Harry Holzer & David Neumark, Assessing Affirmative Action, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
483, 490 n.16 (2000). 
 187. See 15 U.S.C. § 657a(b)(3)(A) (noting that price ―shall be deemed as being lower than the 
price offered by another offeror‖ if it is ―not more than 10 percent higher‖).  
 188. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(a) (setting general preference); § 16C.16(7)(b) (lowering 
preference for construction contracts). HUBZone similarly distinguishes between construction and 
nonconstruction contracts, although not in its preference regime, but rather with regard to sole-source 
procurements. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.612(b) (2006). See generally infra note 205 and accompanying text 
(describing sole source procurements). Also, HUBZone provides preferential rather than detrimental 
treatment to preferred construction bidders, raising the maximum contract amount for set-asides from 
$3,500,000 to $5,500,000. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.612(b). 
 189. Compare CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4533 (granting 5% preference on goods contracts where 50% 
of the total labor hours are accomplished in a distressed area), with CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4534 
(granting 5% preference on goods contracts where 90% of the total labor hours are accomplished in a 
distressed area).  
 190. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533–4534 (creating 5% preference for businesses in specified 
worksites); CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533.1, 4534.1 (creating additional preferences varying in degree 
from 1% to 4% for businesses that already qualify for the preferences depending on how many people 
―with high risk of unemployment‖ it certifies it will hire); see also infra notes 211–14 and 
accompanying text (discussing TACPA‘s employee-specific requirements and ―defining high risk of 
unemployment‖). 
 191. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533.1, 4534.1.  
 192. This would result if a business located within a distressed area as required by sections 4533 
or 4534, and receiving the according 5% preference, agreed under penalty of perjury ―to hire persons 
with high risk of unemployment equal to 20 or more percent of its work force during the period of 
contract performance,‖ which would provide the business with an additional 4% preference. See CAL. 
GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533.1, 4534.1. 
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preference than HUBZone,
193
 but in certain circumstances it may provide a 
greater preference than EDA.
194
 
Two of the programs allow for combination with other preference 
programs, albeit to varying extents. California law allows all of its other 
statutory preferences
195
 to be combined with the TACPA preference, 
provided no business may receive a preference greater than 15% on any 
one contract.
196
 Federal law provides for such combination in limited 
circumstances; namely, where a business is ―both a qualified HUBZone 
[business] and [a Small Disadvantaged Business, it] must receive the 
benefit of both the HUBZone price evaluation preference . . . and the 
[Small Disadvantaged Business] price evaluation preference.‖197 
Minnesota law does not appear to allow combination of its preferences.
198
  
TACPA preferences apply to a limited range of contracts; a contract 
must be worth at least $100,000 to qualify, but the state cannot give a 
preference of more than $50,000 under TACPA alone or $100,000 when 
combined with other programs.
199
 HUBZone contains no such limits in the 
preference context.
200
 While EDA does not limit the maximum dollar 
 
 
 193. Cf. supra note 187 and accompanying text (describing HUBZone‘s absolute 10% 
preference). 
 194. Cf. supra note 188 and accompanying text (demonstrating EDA‘s absolute preferences for 
construction at 4% and nonconstruction at 6%). 
 195. E.g., CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 14838(b)(1) (West 2008) (creating 5% preference for small 
businesses and microbusinesses); CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 42891 (West 2008) (creating 5% 
―preference, wherever feasible, to the suppliers of recycled tire products‖). 
 196. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4535.2 (West 2008) (providing that ―[t]he maximum preference and 
incentive a bidder may be awarded pursuant to [TACPA] and any other provision of law shall be 15 
percent‖). However, companies that receive the small business preference, see supra note 195, ―have 
precedence over nonsmall business bidders in that the application of any bidder preference for which 
nonsmall business bidders may be eligible, including [TACPA], shall not result in the denial of the 
award to a small business bidder.‖ CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4535.2. 
 197. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.614 (2006) (allowing combination only with the small disadvantaged 
business program and verifying that combination with other programs is not allowed in listed Example 
2). 
 198. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7) (2004) (providing ―up to a six percent preference in the 
amount bid on state procurement to small businesses located in an economically disadvantaged area‖ 
(emphasis added)); MINN. R. 1230.1830(D) (2009) (providing that ―when the division awards a 
different percentage preference to a certified targeted group small business and a certified 
economically disadvantaged small business on the same solicitation, the lowest acceptable response 
must be determined by deducting the appropriate preference percent awarded from the acceptable 
responses by the certified small businesses‖ (emphasis added)). 
 199. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4535.2. 
 200. Compare 13 C.F.R. § 126.613 (providing no mention of limits in preference context), with 13 
C.F.R. § 126.612(b) (limiting value of contracts eligible for set-aside procurement). There are, 
however, two relevant limits to any potential HUBZone award. No HUBZone award can be made if 
the contract could be let to Federal Prison Industries, Inc. based on specified statutory language, or if 
the contract could be let to ―participating non-profit agencies for the blind and severely disabled‖ 
under the Jarits-Wagner-O‘Day Act. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.605(a). Moreover, no HUBZone award can 
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amount of any one preference, it does provide limits to ensure that no 
business that receives a specified amount of its gross revenues or sales 
from state contracting preferences or set-asides continues to receive the 
preferences.
201
  
HUBZone is unique among the three in that it utilizes methods other 
than preferences—namely, set-asides and sole-source purchases.202 Set-
asides, which restrict competition to qualified HUBZone businesses,
203
 are 
authorized when a contracting officer has ―a reasonable expectation after 
reviewing [the Small Business Administration‘s] list of qualified 
HUBZone [businesses] that at least two responsible qualified HUBZone 
[businesses] will submit offers‖ and can ―[d]etermine that award can be 
made at fair market price.‖204 A sole-source contract is one in which the 
contracting officer awards the contract to a specific HUBZone business 
after determining that the contract does not exceed specified maximum 
amount limits, that ―[t]wo or more qualified HUBZone [businesses] are 
not likely to submit offers,‖ and that ―the contract award can be made at a 
fair and reasonable price.‖205 The plain language of federal law makes the 
preferences mandatory and the other two methods discretionary,
206
 
 
 
be made if ―[a]n 8(a) participant currently is performing the requirement through the 8(a)BD program 
or SBA has accepted the requirement for award through the 8(a)BD program, unless SBA has 
consented to release the requirement from the 8(a)BD program.‖ See 13 C.F.R. § 126.605(b). 
 201. See MINN. R. 1230.1860. Businesses that received an average of 80% of their gross revenues 
or sales through preferences or set-asides during their second and third years of receiving such 
advantages are no longer eligible. MINN. R. 1230.1860(B)(1). The percentage of gross revenues or 
sales required for disqualification lowers over time: 50% during years four and five, and 40% for years 
six and beyond. See MINN. R. 1230.1860(B)(2)–(3).  
 202. See 15 U.S.C. § 657a(b)(2)(A)–(B) (2006). The same general limits apply to these programs 
as to preferences. See supra note 200 (describing the general limits to HUBZone program). 
 203. 13 C.F.R. § 126.600 (2006). 
 204. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.607. The relationship between various federal set-aside programs is 
provided by regulation. See id. This regulation has been interpreted to give HUBZone priority. See 
Mission Critical Solutions, B-401057 (Comp. Gen. May 4, 2009); Int‘l Program Grp., Inc., B-400278 
(Comp. Gen. Sept. 19, 2008). But see Memorandum from Jeannie S. Rhee, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., U.S. Dep‘t of Justice, to Sara D. Lipscomb, Gen. Counsel, Small Bus. Admin. (Aug. 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2009/sba-hubzone-opinion 082109.pdf (noting that the 
Department of Justice does not interpret HUBZone to ―compel SBA to prioritize the HUBZone 
Program in the manner GAO determined to be required‖). 
 205. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.612. 
 206. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.604 (declaring that ―[t]he contracting officer for the contracting activity 
makes [the] decision‖ whether ―a contract opportunity for HUBZone set-aside competition exists‖); 13 
C.F.R. § 126.612 (declaring that ―[a] contracting officer may award a sole source contract‖ when 
conditions are met (emphasis added)); § 126.613(a)(1) (requiring that ―[w]here a [contracting officer] 
will award a contract on the basis of full and open competition, the [contracting officer] must deem‖ 
the HUBZone business price lower than the non-HUBZone price if preference requirements met 
(emphasis added)). 
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although the contracting officer has a great deal of de facto discretion in 
determining whether HUBZone will apply to any particular contract.
207
  
d. Employee-Specific Requirements 
Although they do so in strikingly different ways, HUBZone, TACPA, 
and EDA recognize the importance of employing people who either reside 
in the areas covered by their respective programs or who have some other 
attribute that hinders their employability. EDA provides the least 
consideration of employee attributes, only considering them under the 
alternative certification method for employment services for the 
disabled.
208
 HUBZone and TACPA, on the other hand, consider how many 
employees exhibit certain economic risk factors, although the two focus on 
different measures of risk and give disparate significance to the 
measures.
209
 Under HUBZone, a threshold requirement for certification is 
that 35% of the business‘s employees reside in a HUBZone.210 TACPA 
imposes no employee-based threshold requirement, but it does provide 
additional and increasing preferences based on how many employees are 
at a high risk of unemployment.
211
 One can be at ―high risk of 
unemployment‖ under TACPA regardless of where he lives,212 as the term 
of art includes the following statutorily defined classes of people: 
economically disadvantaged youth, economically disadvantaged ex-
convicts, vocational rehabilitation referrals, youth participating in a 
qualified cooperative education program, recipients of supplemental social 
security income, general assistance recipients,
213
 applicants and recipients 
of aid to families with dependent children who would have registered for 
 
 
 207. See BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 126 (citing anecdotal evidence and data suggesting 
that ―contracting officers are not using the program,‖ including the fact that ―only one in eight (13 
percent) has used a HUBZone setaside, sole source, or price preference in awarding a contract‖); cf. 13 
C.F.R. § 126.603 (advising certified businesses to ―market their capabilities to appropriate contracting 
activities in order to increase the prospect that the contracting activity will adopt an acquisition 
strategy that includes HUBZone contract opportunities‖). 
 208. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7)(c)(3) (2004); see also supra note 183 and accompanying text 
(describing these alternate methods).  
 209. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533.1, 4534.1 (West 2008); 13 C.F.R. § 126.200(a)(3)(i), (b)(4). 
 210. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.200(a)(3)(i), (b)(4); see also supra note 148 (discussing HUBZone‘s 
statutory definition of employee). 
 211. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533.1, 4534.1. 
 212. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(f). 
 213. These classes qualify based on their inclusion in Section 321 of Public Law 95-600 as 
incorporated by section 4532(f)(1) of the California Government Code.  
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the Work Incentive Program, and aid to families with dependent children 
recipients who have been receiving welfare for at least ninety days.
214
  
The sliding scale under TACPA provides a 1% preference if the 
employer agrees to hire persons at high risk of unemployment equal to 
5%–9% of its workforce during the period of contract performance, a 2% 
preference for 10%–14% of the workforce, 3% for 15%–19% of the 
workforce, and 4% for 20% or more of the workforce.
215
 This preference 
is in addition to the 5% base preference.
216
 This sliding-scale approach 
results in TACPA being more inclusive and less arbitrary than HUBZone 
with respect to employee-specific percentage requirements.
217
 However, 
TACPA‘s focus emphasizes the personal attributes of the employee much 
more than HUBZone, which only considers his place of residence.
218
 This 
more exacting focus on employee attributes may explain why TACPA is 
less demanding than HUBZone on its percentage requirements.
219
 
Both TACPA and HUBZone, the two programs that rely on 
representations about how many employees satisfy certain criteria, contain 
provisions designed to ensure that the contractor will carry through with 
such representations. HUBZone requires that the businesses ―attempt to 
maintain‖ the percentage during performance of the contract,220 which 
 
 
 214. The classes subsequent to note 213 qualify based on their inclusion in Section 322 of Public 
Law 95-600 as incorporated by section 4532(f)(2) of the California Government Code.  
 215. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533.1, 4534.1 (West 2008). 
 216. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
 217. The 35% requirement is absolute under HUBZone. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 126.200(a)(3)(i), 
126.200(b)(4) (2006). However, there is no absolute employee requirement under TACPA. See CAL. 
GOV‘T CODE §§ 4533, 4534. The result is that a business that employs 34% of its labor from a 
HUBZone is absolutely ineligible for HUBZone preference. Under TACPA, however, such arbitrary 
distinctions in numbers never lead to outright disqualification. At worst, they lead to a lower marginal 
preference. 
 218. Compare 13 C.F.R. § 126.200(b)(4) (requiring that 35% of employees live in HUBZones), 
with CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4532(f)(1) (defining high risk of unemployment based on specific 
requirements discussed in text accompanying notes 213 and 214).  
 219. In 2008, only thirty-four businesses were certified under TACPA. See E-mail from Rachel 
Voong, Dep‘t of Gov‘t Servs., to author (Sept. 21, 2009, 15:49 CST) (on file with author). In that same 
year, there were 886 registered HUBZone businesses in California. See BEALE & DEAS, supra note 
161, at 5. Although this is somewhat like comparing apples and oranges because HUBZone provides 
for ongoing certification while TACPA provides for contract-by-contract certification, see infra Part 
II.D.2.f., this apparent disparity does at least suggest that TACPA is perceived by contractors to be 
more demanding than HUBZone despite its more relaxed percentage preferences. One plausible 
explanation for this perception is the difficulty of determining whether 20% of one‘s employees would 
qualify for the various programs listed in notes 213 and 214, as opposed to merely ascertaining 
whether or not they live in a HUBZone. Cf. Roney, supra note 70, at 944–45 (noting that HUBZone‘s 
less intrusive ―residence requirement could place an employer in the unenviable position of soliciting 
personal information from its employees or potential employees—information such as the employee‘s 
intent to live on his or her street indefinitely‖). 
 220. 13 C.F.R. §§ 126.200(a)(3)(iii), 126.200(b)(5). 
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means that employers must ―mak[e] substantive and documented efforts 
such as written offers of employment, published advertisements seeking 
employees, and attendance at job fairs.‖221 TACPA similarly requires that 
participating employers 
[a]ct in good faith for the purpose of maintaining such persons as 
employees for the duration of contract performance; and . . . make a 
reasonable effort to replace such persons, who for any reason 
permanently cease to be on the payroll, with other persons with high 
risk of unemployment.
222
  
Violations of these requirements subject bidders to suspension, debarment, 
and penalties of both the civil and criminal variety.
223
 
e. Size limitations  
Only small businesses are eligible for HUBZone
224
 and EDA.
225
 
TACPA is not explicitly limited to small businesses,
226
 but California law 
does provide for an additional preference to small businesses
227
 that can be 
added to the TACPA preference.
228
 EDA is unique among the three 
 
 
 221. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103. 
 222. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 1896.40(c)(1)–(2) (2009). TACPA also imposes an affirmative 
obligation to report ―any such persons who have been terminated or absent from work.‖ See CAL. 
CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 1896.40(c)(3). 
 223. See CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4535.1 (West 2008) (providing for restitution to state, punitive fees, 
and inability to conduct business with state for violation of TACPA provisions); 13 C.F.R. § 126.900 
(2006) (describing potential suspension, disbarment, civil penalties, and criminal liability emanating 
from violation of HUBZone requirements). 
 224. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.203 (2006) (requiring that businesses be small according to NAICS code 
to be eligible for HUBZone). The company must be small both at the time it is certified as a HUBZone 
business and at the time of the initial contract offer. Id. While ―[a] large business may not participate 
as a prime contractor on a HUBZone award[, it] may participate as a subcontractor to an otherwise 
qualified HUBZone SBC.‖ 13 C.F.R. § 126.615 (2006). 
 225. See MINN. STAT. § 16C.16(7) (2004) (creating preferences ―for small businesses‖); see also 
MINN. R. 1230.1600(3)(B) (2009) (defining ―small business category‖ as the lower quartile of 
businesses based on ―representative annual market consisting of the total gross revenues or sales 
generated by the reporting sample class‖ as determined by SIC or NAICS codes). 
 226. Compare CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 4531 (West 2008) (declaring that the purpose of TACPA 
program is to provide preferences to ―California based companies‖ (emphasis added)), with 13 C.F.R. 
§ 126.100 (2006) (declaring that the purpose of HUBZone program ―is to provide federal contracting 
assistance for qualified [small business concerns] located in historically underutilized business zones 
in an effort to increase employment opportunities, investment, and economic development in such 
areas‖ (emphasis added)). 
 227. CAL. GOV‘T CODE § 14838(b)(1) (West 2008) (creating 5% preference for small businesses 
and microbusinesses). 
 228. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing preference combination rules and 
small business preference taking precedence over TACPA). 
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programs in that it effectively provides for an additional size limit by 
―graduat[ing]‖ a business from the program once it ―has captured a 
proportionate share in its market for assets employed‖ relative to the 
amount of time it has been receiving preferences.
229
 
f. Certification 
Once a business is certified under HUBZone
230
 or EDA,
231
 it remains 
certified, provided it maintains the original certification requirements.
232
 
Also, a business can be graduated from EDA if it either captures a 
proportionate share in its market
233
 or if it receives more than a certain 
percentage of its contracts from the program based on how long it has 
participated.
234
 HUBZone provides some relief to businesses who would 
otherwise lose certification based on changes to the relevant 
socioeconomic attributes of the area in which their business is located.
235
 
 
 
 229. See MINN. R. 1230.1860(C)(3) (2009). A business is graduated when its proportionate market 
share in terms of assets employed averages 200% in the first year, 175% in the first two years, 150% in 
the first three years, 125% thereafter. See id. 
 230. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.300 (2006) (providing that an interested business must ―apply to SBA 
for certification‖ and that ―[i]f SBA determines that the concern is a qualified HUBZone SBC, it will 
issue a certification to that effect and add the concern to the List‖). This is the only way to be certified 
under HUBZone. 13 C.F.R. § 126.301. To be eligible for contracts, the business must in fact be on the 
list of certified businesses, regardless of whether its exclusion from the list was proper or not. See 13 
C.F.R. § 126.308; see also HUBZone Contractor Gateway Search, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., 
http://dsbs.sba.gov/dsbs/search/dsp_searchhubzone.cfm (last modified May. 4, 2007) (list of certified 
HUBZone businesses). A denied or decertified business must wait one year to reapply. See 13 C.F.R. 
§ 126.309. Certification in and of itself does not guarantee that the business will receive contracts. See 
13 C.F.R. § 126.603; see also BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at ii (noting that only 23% of certified 
businesses have received contracts under the program). 
 231. See MINN. R. 1230.1700 (2009) (outlining the certification process, including an extensive 
list of documents that must be submitted); see also MINN. R. 1230.1805 (requiring creation of 
directory of eligible businesses). The directory can be accessed online. See TG/ED List (Directory), 
MINN. MATERIALS MGMT. DIV., http://www.mmd.admin.state.mn.us/process/search/ (last visited May 
1, 2011). 
 232. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.601(c) (requiring that any participating business ―be a qualified 
HUBZone SBC both at the time of its initial offer and at the time of award in order to be eligible for a 
HUBZone contract‖); MINN. R. 1230.1860(C)(2) (graduating business from EDA if ―demographic 
statistics justify loss of status as a labor surplus area, a 70 percent median income county, or a 
disadvantaged area‖). HUBZone accomplishes this by requiring a certification that the business still 
qualifies at the time an offer for a contract is made. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.601(d). EDA, on the other 
hand, imposes an affirmative obligation on businesses to notify the state if any of the conditions 
making it eligible change at any time, which ―is not limited to changes occurring while an application 
is pending approval.‖ See MINN. R. 1230.1905. 
 233. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 235. See supra note 181. This is a temporary designation, however, because an area is not 
redesignated until results from the 2010 census are announced or three years after the area ceased to be 
eligible, whichever is later. See 13 C.F.R. § 126.103. This ―grandfather‖ period is intended to ―provide 
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TACPA, on the other hand, requires certification each time a bidder 
submits a bid.
236
 All three programs require that the business maintain the 
requirements for certification during the life of the certification.
237
 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Previous Parts have explained the goals of class-based affirmative 
action, the likelihood that many state and local governments will soon be 
(or have already begun) turning to alternatives to their traditional 
affirmative action programs, the structure of three existing ―place-not-
race‖ programs, and that the American population is generally more likely 
to approve of class-based programs than race-based programs.
238
 Having 
placed three programs under the figurative state-as-laboratories 
microscope to flesh out their respective form and function, the question 
becomes: what should such a program look like if a state or local 
government wishes to continue using contracting as a means to effectuate 
socioeconomic policy?
239
 
Three basic premises will guide this discussion. First, recall that the 
stated purpose of ―place-not-race‖ programs is to encourage job creation in 
distressed areas.
240
 Further, recall that class-based affirmative action seeks 
to remedy relative inequality of opportunity.
241
 Finally, recall that class-
 
 
sufficient time for firms to recoup a return on their investment in locating their businesses in qualified 
HUBZone areas.‖ See HUBZone, Government Contracting, 8(a) Business Development and Small 
Business Size Standard Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 51,243, 51,245 (Aug. 30, 2005) (to be codified at 13 
C.F.R. pts. 121, 124–26). The alternative method regarding 2010 census data was added to provide 
additional time to firms that had already moved as opposed to those that were considering the impacts 
of moving. See id. 
 236. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 1896.40 (2009) (defining certification requirements in terms of 
―the duration of contract performance‖). 
 237. See 13 C.F.R. §§ 126.200(a)(3)(iii), 126.200(b)(5) (requiring that HUBZone businesses 
―attempt to maintain‖ the requisite number of employees); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 1896.40 
(requiring business receiving contract to comply with terms of TACPA, ―[a]ct in good faith‖ to 
maintain the requisite number of employees, and to make ―reasonable efforts to replace such persons‖ 
as necessary); MINN. R. 1230.1905 (2009) (requiring EDA businesses to notify state of changes in 
eligibility which will then be used under section 1230.1860 to graduate the business from the 
program). 
 238. See supra note 56. 
 239. Cf. Sarah M. Morehouse & Malcom E. Jewell, States as Laboratories: A Reprise, 7 ANN. 
REV. POL. SCI., 177, 198 (2004) (noting that ―[a]s laboratories of democracy, the states must provide 
for their poor‖). The laboratory analogy is attributed to Justice Louis Brandeis, who called states 
‗laboratories of democracy‘ ―because he viewed them as sources of experimentation, with new 
solutions to social and economic questions.‖ Id. at 177. Of course, states can also learn from the 
federal government, which is in effect a fifty-first point of comparison. Cf. id. (noting that ―[t]he 50 
states offer much greater opportunity for comparative research than is found in Congress‖). 
 240. See supra notes 127, 129 and accompanying text. 
 241. See supra notes 86–88 and accompanying text; see also Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative 
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based affirmative action programs must recognize and account for the 
administrative and political obstacles to their adoption and 
implementation.
242
 
To accomplish these goals, any such program should focus on the 
smallest geographic area possible. The size of the area matters for two 
reasons. First, providing preferences to too large of an area would increase 
the costs of the program by increasing the number of businesses eligible 
for the preference, while also dissipating the program‘s impact.243 Second, 
the more people who live in the area, the more likely that the individual 
attributes of the people who live in it will be muddled, meaning that the 
use of the geographic area as a proxy for class becomes less valid.
244
 An 
underlying premise of ―place-not-race‖ programs is that where one lives 
may serve as an effective proxy for the economic disadvantage he has 
suffered and that this, in turn, serves as an obstacle to his employment.
245
 
The proxy is used to make the program more administrable as it is 
relatively easy for an employer to know where his employees live.
246
 
Indeed, all HUBZone requires an employer to know about his employees 
 
 
Action, supra note 84, at 1085 (noting that ―a class-based program should correct for relative 
inequality of opportunity‖). 
 242. See supra notes 117–22 and accompanying text. 
 243. See BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 227. 
 244. See Arline T. Geronimus, John Bound & Lisa J. Neidert, On the Validity of Using Census 
Geocode Characteristics to Proxy Individual Socioeconomic Characteristics, 91 J. AM. STAT. ASS‘N 
529, 536 (1996) (suggesting that ―aggregate variables based on more narrowly defined geographic 
areas . . . would be better proxies‖ while conceding that there is no ―empirical evidence to rule out the 
possibility that block group data for a less select sample might better represent individual 
characteristics than census tracts or zip codes‖); see also supra notes 164–70 and accompanying text 
(discussing approaches under existing programs and analyzing why size matters); cf. BEALE & DEAS, 
supra note 161, at 228 (providing example of similar phenomenon under HUBZone due to 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas being classified differently). 
 245. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1080 (discussing a 
sophisticated definition of class and noting that ―much evidence supports William Julius Wilson‘s 
thesis that neighborhood matters, and the debate should turn on how much weight to give this factor, 
not on whether it should count at all‖ (footnote omitted)). This is even truer for blacks than for whites, 
as ―richer white families live in more affluent areas, while poorer minorities often live in meager 
surroundings.‖ EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, 
IDENTITY, AND ECONOMICS 76 (2005). 
 246. Cf. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1092–93 (noting that a 
requirement to hire based on class preferences would be easier to administer if ―graduating high school 
students who wish to benefit from a class preference must fill out a standard form providing readily 
accessible data, such as the identity of a student‘s high school, her place of residence, family structure, 
and parental income‖); Roney, supra note 70, at 944 (describing the ―unenviable position [for an 
employer] of soliciting personal information from its employees‖). Employers collect an employee‘s 
address when they are hired. See Hiring Employees, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (Dec. 17, 2008), 
http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98164,00.html (noting that employers are required to 
collect an I-9 form from employees at hiring). 
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is where they live,
247
 while TACPA requires employers who wish to 
receive additional preferences to look into far more intrusive areas such as 
their employees‘ criminal histories, ages, receipt of welfare, and number 
of dependents.
248
 While the creation of a standardized form
249
 to provide 
employers with this detailed information about employees as a way to 
avoid the use of proxy information might seem appealing, this form would 
likely suffer the same flaws as FAFSA, the government form to determine 
federal financial aid for college, which ―[m]ost everyone agrees . . . 
something is very wrong with‖ because ―it scares off the very families 
most in need.‖250  
In this context, the smallest practical classification is the census block 
group.
251
 There are two principal concerns to using such a small unit: 
arbitrary exclusion and failure to treat disadvantaged areas that span 
multiple block groups as such. Arbitrary exclusion is epitomized by two 
businesses situated across the street from one another that, for all intents 
and purposes, are in the same economic and geographic position, but 
which are treated differently because one side of the street is considered 
disadvantaged while the other is not.
252
 TACPA suggests a solution to this 
concern through the creation of a buffer of one census block around 
qualified census blocks.
253
 To ensure that the buffer, which itself did not 
qualify for the preference, is appropriately treated differently, it should be 
given a lower base percentage preference than businesses located in block 
groups that qualified on their own merits.
254
 Of course, this merely extends 
the problem of arbitrariness to the boundary between the buffer and the 
surrounding area, but this is less troublesome as it is less likely to exclude 
legitimately deserving businesses.
255
 As to the failure to treat large 
 
 
 247. See supra text accompanying note 210. 
 248. See supra notes 213, 214 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1092–93. 
 250. See Tamar Lewin, The Big Test Before College? Filling out the Financial Aid Form, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at A1. 
 251. See supra note 164; see also supra notes 156–63 (discussing alternative geographic units).  
 252. See BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 227–28 (relating anecdotal evidence of this wrong-
side-of-the-street problem under HUBZone). 
 253. See supra notes 151, 152 and accompanying text. 
 254. See infra note 279 and accompanying text (recommending a variable preference to account 
for material differences between applicants). 
 255. Cf. TERRY D. CLARK, JENNIFER M. LARSON, JOHN N. MORDESON, JOSHUA D. POTTER & 
MARK J. WIERMAN, APPLYING FUZZY SET MATHEMATICS TO FORMAL MODELS IN COMPARATIVE 
POLITICS 29–30 (2008) (explaining the mathematical concept of partial membership in a fuzzy set and 
the corresponding difficulty of ―determin[ing] which objects are in the set and which objects are not in 
the set‖). In fact, certain fuzzy set theorists have used the problem of drawing an ―exact dividing line 
between rich and poor,‖ and the related problem of where ―the middle class fit[s] into such a 
categorization,‖ as examples of where fuzzy set theory can be helpful. See id. at 31. Because ―[t]he 
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disadvantaged areas as a whole, the approach taken by TACPA again 
presents an appealing solution: contiguous qualifying block groups should 
be treated as one disadvantaged area known as a cluster.
256
 This maintains 
the proper focus on isolating disadvantaged areas while also allowing for 
the broadest geographical definition thereof. It also ensures that non-
disadvantaged block groups do not muddle the analysis. 
Having recommended the appropriate geographical confines of a 
qualifying area, the next issue is what socioeconomic conditions an area 
must exhibit to receive benefits under the program. The existing programs 
focus principally on unemployment, poverty, and income.
257
 A focus on 
income makes sense, as the ―simple definition of class‖—with class being 
the obvious core of class-based affirmative action—focuses on family 
income.
258
 A focus on levels of unemployment also makes sense, as a 
stated goal of these programs is to encourage employment in 
disadvantaged areas.
259
 In the end, a determination of which of these 
factors to focus on and to what degree is a political question that will vary 
to a great degree across governments; to be sure, decisions about how 
many areas to include in the program are necessarily decisions about how 
much a government is willing to spend on such programs. Accordingly, 
decisions about precisely which types of areas will be given preference in 
any particular area should be made after considering the potential impact 
and cost of any particular approach in the relevant area.  
Whichever of these factors a government decides to focus on, a new 
tool will aid them in determining which areas satisfy their criteria based on 
more current data than the decennial census provides.
260
 The American 
Community Survey (ACS), an undertaking of the U.S. Census Bureau, 
―provides single-year labor force estimates‖ and ―has been optimized . . . 
to produce accurate estimates for geographic areas as small as census 
 
 
fundamental idea of fuzzy set theory is that real world phenomenon,‖ such as the dividing line for 
eligibility for statutory preferences like those considered herein, ―cannot be divided cleanly into black 
or white divisions,‖ id., the buffer approach recommended in this Note, see supra text accompanying 
note 253, is, in a way, a crude operationalization of fuzzy set theory. 
 256. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 257. See supra notes 171–80 and accompanying text (analyzing approaches taken by HUBZone, 
TACPA, and EDA). 
 258. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1074. 
 259. See supra notes 127, 129 and accompanying text. 
 260. Of course, the more current the data that is used, the more longitudinal variation there will be 
as to which areas qualify. To address the situations in which these timing issues would be problematic, 
something like HUBZone‘s Redesignated Area concept, see supra note 181, might be required to 
address these concerns. See BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 229 (―The Redesignated Area seems to 
be a reasonable practical compromise on the issue of loss of HUBZone status . . . .‖). 
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tracts and block groups.‖261 Because the program being recommended 
herein focuses on clusters of block groups, and because ACS plans to 
make available more recent poverty and unemployment data at this 
level,
262
 ACS data may be helpful in the administration of these 
programs.
263
  
The next layer of analysis is determining what type of connection to a 
qualifying cluster of block groups a business must maintain to receive a 
preference. The goal of job creation in disadvantaged areas is furthered 
whenever an employer hires people from these areas, regardless of 
whether it is in the business‘s principal office, as required by HUBZone,264 
or merely a branch.
265
 TACPA acknowledges this through the connection 
method of certification, which allows certification of businesses that, over 
a period of three years, have had a major office or manufacturing facility 
in the state and which have employed Californians.
266
 These businesses 
need only have a worksite in the distressed area and ensure that the 
required amount of work is conducted in the disadvantaged area to satisfy 
the connection requirement.
267
 Such an approach is superior to the 
principal office approach because the focus remains on job creation for 
prospective employees, which is the core of this type of employment-
focused class-based affirmative action.  
The use of such a discerning method to isolate the preferred geographic 
areas brings with it an accompanying effect that serves as further 
justification of ―place-not-race‖ programs for those who support race-
based affirmative action and who would prefer to maintain those 
programs. Although class-based affirmative action would in theory result 
 
 
 261. Guidance on Differences in Employment and Unemployment Estimates from Different 
Sources, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/laborfor/laborguidance092209. 
html (last visited May 1, 2010); see also American Community Survey (ACS), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/index.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2011) (ACS homepage). 
 262. See U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING 
AND USING AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT RESEARCHERS NEED TO KNOW 2, 11 
(2009), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/ACSResearch.pdf. 
 263. Cf. U.S. DEP‘T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, A COMPASS FOR UNDERSTANDING 
AND USING AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY DATA: WHAT STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS NEED 
TO KNOW (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/ACSstateLocal.pdf 
(providing assistance to state and local governments that wish to use ACS data). 
 264. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
 265. Cf. BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 230–32 (discussing complications under HUBZone‘s 
principal office requirement when a business has multiple branches, as well as ―a strong, if largely 
implicit, presumption that actual performance of a HUBZone contract would take place at a business 
location in a HUBZone‖). 
 266. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
 267. See supra notes 151, 189 and accompanying text. 
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in fewer minorities than whites being preferred,
268
 using place as a proxy 
for socioeconomic status rather than some other measure of disadvantage 
should increase the percentage of minorities benefited due to the high 
degree of residential segregation in the United States.
269
 Blacks have 
historically been the victims of a great deal of residential segregation that 
is decreasing to some extent, but which remains relatively high.
270
 Indeed, 
one in three blacks lives in a ―hypersegregated‖ area.271 Empirical studies 
reveal the ―growing importance of the interaction between residential 
segregation and income inequality in determining the concentration of 
poverty, an interaction that obviously disadvantages blacks compared to 
other groups in the United States.‖272 As a result, programs that target 
disadvantaged areas are more likely to benefit blacks than are programs 
that focus on individual attributes alone.
273
 This is because blacks have not 
only faced the obvious economic barriers that justify class-based 
affirmative action, but have also faced structural barriers that have resulted 
in anachronistic residential patterns that in and of themselves harm 
blacks.
274
 It would be a mistake, however, for this to become the primary 
motivation of class-based affirmative action; although class-based 
affirmative action appears to be constitutional in the run of cases,
275
 a race-
based rationale for adopting the programs could increase the risk of 
challenges under the Equal Protection Clause.
276
  
 
 
 268. See supra notes 102–05 and accompanying text.  
 269. See john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW & 
INEQ. 355, 390 (2007) (stating that a variety of historical factors, including residential segregation, 
have ―locked Blacks out of the middle class‖). Although powell concludes ―that race neutral tactics are 
not up to the task . . . of addressing many of the structural problems that prevent the development of 
social solidarity across racial boundaries,‖ he does note that ―class and race interact and are not 
separable.‖ Id. at 426. 
 270. See JOHN ICELAND, DANIEL H. WEINBERG & ERIKA STEINMETZ, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
Residential Segregation of Blacks or African Americans, in RACIAL AND ETHNIC SEGREGATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 1980–2000, at 59 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ 
housing_patterns/pdf/ch5.pdf. 
 271. Douglas S. Massey & Mary J. Fischer, How Segregation Concentrates Poverty, 23 ETHNIC & 
RACIAL STUD. 670, 671 (2000). 
 272. Id. at 685. 
 273. Cf. JOHN EDWARDS, WHEN RACE COUNTS: THE MORALITY OF RACIAL PREFERENCES IN 
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 183 (1995) (noting that preferences for all minority groups, without 
disaggregating them into their respective races, to a certain extent, ―will not matter, given relatively 
high degrees of residential segregation‖ because ―[i]f the labour draw area is predominantly black, the 
programmes, if successful, will pull in blacks even if the goal relates to ‗all minorities‘‖). 
 274. See supra notes 270–72 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 276. See Chapin Cimino, Comment, Class-Based Preferences in Affirmative Action Programs 
After Miller v Johnson: A Race-Neutral Option, or Subterfuge?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1289, 1289–91 
(1997) (noting that the Supreme Court‘s enthusiasm for ―race-neutral‖ alternatives to affirmative 
action may be in conflict with its hesitancy towards ―subterfuge,‖ or covertly doing by permissible 
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For those who support class-based affirmative action without regard to 
race, understanding the interactive nature of economic opportunity and 
place of residence serves to mitigate, at least to some degree, the ―top of 
the bottom‖ and ―close swap‖ concerns.277 Although the system will still 
select in the manner contemplated by the critique, the consequences will 
be less troubling because the described method can isolate areas where 
many factors have worked together to hinder people in the job market. 
Therefore, although the people who are selected will still be the ―top of the 
bottom,‖ characterizing this as a ―close swap‖ becomes less valid because 
those being benefited are more disadvantaged than they would otherwise 
be. That is, the distance of the swap is far greater than it would be in the 
metaphorical Cosby-kids swap in the race context.
278
 
Moreover, the program should be based on percentage preferences after 
competitive bidding, not set-asides or sole-source procurements, for 
several reasons. First, preferences can be adjusted to reflect the relative 
disadvantage of the applicants,
279
 while set-asides and sole-source 
procurements are less flexible.
280
 A carefully crafted variable preference 
will encourage businesses to strive for the next level of preference, while 
also continually furthering the program‘s goals.281 Second, preferences can 
 
 
means what one cannot do by impermissible means, in other equal protection contexts); cf. 
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976) (establishing that there can be no Equal Protection 
violation without proof of a purpose to discriminate); Pyke v. Cuomo, 567 F.3d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(indicating that geographical classifications that are not ―insidious proxies for suspect racial 
classifications‖ are not suspect classifications). Despite the potential for these novel subterfuge 
challenges, some legislators apparently continue to advocate for class-based programs as a way to do 
indirectly what cannot be done directly. See supra note 6 (describing city councilman who makes 
similar argument). Certain Justices of the Supreme Court have implicitly encouraged this sort of 
analysis. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (encouraging school boards to 
consider, inter alia, ―drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of 
neighborhoods‖ because such ―mechanisms are race conscious but do not lead to different treatment 
based on a [racial] classification.‖).  
 277. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (outlining the critiques). 
 278. See supra text accompanying note 101 (discussing one critique of race-based affirmative 
action focusing on situations in which children who would otherwise not be seen as disadvantaged, 
such as Bill Cosby‘s children, receive preferences). 
 279. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1085 (describing two-tier 
system admission at Berkeley based on how far below median their family income was); Roney, supra 
note 70, at 958 (recommending a differential preference based on size of business). 
 280. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Distinguishing Five Models of Affirmative Action, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 42, 42 (1988–90). Oppenheimer notes that the ―quota model‖ of affirmative 
action leads to opportunities being ―set aside to be occupied only by‖ members of the protected class. 
Id. at 43. ―The preference model,‖ on the other hand, takes account of one‘s status in a protected class 
but is ―flexible.‖ Id. at 46.  
 281. Cf. Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Glenn C. Loury, Affirmative Action and Its Mythology, 19 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 147, 154 (2005) (describing ―affirmative action as a form of market regulation that 
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operate within existing merit-based bidding programs rather than requiring 
a separate system for class-based applicants.
282
 Because class-based 
affirmative action is intended to ―adjust for the latent potential of those 
who have faced obstacles and done fairly well nonetheless,‖ this variable 
preference effectively adjusts the required merit of the bid to a slightly 
lower level when a business faces burdens at a slightly higher level.
283
 
This also makes the program more administrable by removing discretion 
from contracting officers to decide which regime to apply.
284
 Finally, 
preferences tend to be more politically palatable than more exclusive 
programs precisely because they do not remove consideration of merit.
285
 
The preference should increase accordingly as the employer hires more 
people from the targeted area, much like TACPA does.
286
 However, unlike 
TACPA, the focus should be on where the employee lives and not a more 
 
 
induces a shift in demand for the services of persons at various skill levels in affected groups‖ and how 
such ―policies may lead firms to hire or promote minority applicants at a given skill level, even though 
similar nonminority applicants would be rejected‖). Under HUBZone, the only incentives are to locate 
one‘s principal place of business in a HUBZone, see supra note 146 and accompanying text, and to 
employ 35% of one‘s staff from HUBZones, see supra note 210 and accompanying text. Therefore, 
there is no benefit from going from 35% to 36%. Under TACPA, however, an employer who only 
employs 8% of employees who are at risk of unemployment will receive an additional 1% price 
preference if he increases the percentage of his workforce at high risk of unemployment to 9%. See 
supra note 215 and accompanying text. And then, once he hits 14%, he will receive another 1%. Id.  
 282. See Oppenheimer, supra note 280, at 46 (noting that all applicants are considered together 
while some receive the advantage of having a certain quality in a preference approach). 
 283. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1061; see also supra note 
87 and accompanying text (discussing the balancing nature of the theory).  
 284. Cf. BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 229–30 (noting that HUBZone preferences are 
mandated by law but that contracting officers do not appear to understand this, which frustrates 
HUBZone advocates). In theory, a city or state will have fewer contracting officers to train and will be 
better able to enforce such a preference than the federal government. Cf. Roney, supra note 70, at 956 
(noting that the federal government has engaged in various attempts to train contracting officers, 
including travelling, disseminating literature, and posting information to the internet, but that ―many 
[contracting officers] remain uncomfortable‖ with the program). 
 285. See Faye J. Crosby, Aarti Iyer & Sirinda Sincharoen, Understanding Affirmative Action, 57 
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 585, 595–96 (2006) (suggesting that people support softer forms of affirmative 
action at higher rates than harder forms, especially when assured that merit is taken into account). This 
hostility toward the more absolute programs is not only held by the electorate, but also the judiciary. 
See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 637–38 (1987) (holding, under 
Title VII, that goals do not ―unnecessarily trammel[]‖ the rights of the nonpreferred class like quotas 
do because no one is automatically excluded); Univ. of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 319–20 
(1978) (Powell, J., announcing the judgment of the Court) (―No matter how strong their qualifications, 
quantitative and extracurricular, including their own potential for contribution to educational diversity, 
[members of nonpreferred groups] are never afforded the chance to compete with applicants from the 
preferred groups for the special admissions seats [that are set aside by a quota]. . . . The fatal flaw in 
petitioner‘s preferential program is its disregard of individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . For this reason, that portion of the California court‘s judgment holding petitioner‘s 
special admissions program invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment must be affirmed.‖). 
 286. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.  
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detailed inquiry into the employee‘s background to ensure that the 
program is administrable.
287
 While this approach favors administrative 
convenience over a more accurate measure of relative inequality of 
opportunity,
288
 administrability is at the heart of an effective government 
preference program because it prevents the program from being overrun 
with fraud and abuse.
289
 The federal government has recently started 
cracking down on fraud in the HUBZone system, especially those 
businesses that falsely claim to have met the 35% requirement.
290
 Four of 
the firms that failed to meet this requirement had 33, 53, 74, and 116 
employees, respectively.
291
 To audit these four businesses under a 
TACPA-like approach that considers a variety of individual factors rather 
than mere residency, the government would have to apply various 
standards to 276 employees to determine if the correct preferences were 
applied.
292
 Because state and local governments tend to have less money to 
spend on enforcing these procurement laws than the federal government 
does, ease of auditing is a crucial factor in the success of any program.
293
 
Various other factors could also result in different levels of preference. 
To be as true as possible to the theory of class-based affirmative action, 
which seeks to benefit people at ―‗meritocratic crisis points‘ relatively 
 
 
 287. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text; see also BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 
235 (noting that under a residency-only approach, ―[a]ll you have to do is sit down with payroll 
information and enter addresses into the HUBZone mapping system‖). 
 288. But see supra note 107 (noting that care must be taken to avoid oversimplying these 
programs to such an extent that they undermine their own purposes). 
 289. See MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE PROJECT STAFF, Overview of the Procurement Process, 
Related Frauds, and the Model Procurement Code, in IDENTIFYING AND PROSECUTING FRAUD AND 
ABUSE IN STATE AND LOCAL CONTRACTING 3 (1984) (noting that an ideal procurement program 
would provide for competition and dissuade illegal conduct); see also Kahlenberg, supra note 84, at 
1066 (noting that verifiable information and serious penalties for fraud are necessary); supra notes 
117–20 and accompanying text (noting that fraud prevention is a crucial component of making any 
social program, including class-based affirmative action programs, administrable). 
 290. See U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HUBZONE PROGRAM: FRAUD AND ABUSE 
IDENTIFIED IN FOUR METROPOLITAN AREAS 8–10 (2009), available at http://www.sba.gov/idc/groups 
/public/documents/sba_program_office/hubzone_reports_d09440t.pdf [hereinafter FRAUD REPORT] 
(discussing several firms who received contracts despite various violations, including a failure to meet 
the 35% employee requirement and the principal office requirement). 
 291. Id. 
 292. Because the recommended program is not limited to small businesses, see supra text 
accompanying note 278, this problem would be even worse for governments adopting the program 
because larger businesses have more employees to audit.  
 293. See Sudeep Reddy & Conor Dougherty, Governments Shed More Workers, WALL ST. J., 
Sept. 5, 2009, at A2 (noting that the federal government can borrow money but states must generally 
balance budgets, which leaves little additional revenue, especially in time of economic uncertainty); cf. 
Daniel J. Castleman, Op-Ed, How to Guard Against Stimulus Fraud, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2010, at 
A17 (predicting large-scale fraud under the federal stimulus program and that ―[p]robably no one‖ will 
prevent this fraud, ―particularly at the state and local level‖). 
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early in life,‖294 additional preferences could be given to employers who 
hire younger people, such as recent high school graduates, from these 
areas.
295
 Also, as suggested above, the preference could be adjusted 
downward for businesses located in qualifying buffer areas rather than the 
technical boundaries of the disadvantaged area.
296
  
Further, the program should not be limited to small businesses. Doing 
so ignores the primary goal of job creation in distressed areas.
297
 By 
disqualifying employers who are capable of employing a larger number of 
people from distressed areas, as HUBZone and EDA do,
298
 the program is 
essentially defeating its own purpose.
299
 Of course, governments have 
compelling reasons to encourage small business development as well.
300
 
Therefore, if a state or local government determines that those policies are 
as important as the policies behind a ―place-not-race‖ program, or if it 
determines that awarding contracting preferences to large businesses 
would be politically impractical, it could grant an additional preference to 
businesses that qualify under a preexisting small business preference 
program.
301
  
To prevent fraud, the system must have an effective certification 
program. The federal government has recently identified a variety of cases 
of outright fraud in the HUBZone program, which essentially provides for 
continuing certification contingent on self-certification.
302
 It is unclear 
whether the continuing-certification approach adopted by HUBZone and 
EDA or the TACPA approach requiring recertification at the time of each 
 
 
 294. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 295. Cf. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1067 (arguing that ―class 
preferences make sense in the university admissions process, both because applicants are still 
generally young, and because universities already have access to a wealth of information about an 
applicant‘s background‖). 
 296. See supra note 254 and accompanying text (recommending variable preference in this 
context). 
 297. See supra notes 127, 129 and accompanying text. 
 298. See supra notes 224, 225 and accompanying text. 
 299. See Roney, supra note 70, at 958 (noting that opening HUBZone to larger businesses would 
offer greater employment opportunity and that this and other limitations ―could virtually ensure that 
the program will never be successful‖); cf. BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 235 (noting that ―[i]f a 
business is small, location and residency of employees are the only real barriers‖).  
 300. See About SBA, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/about-sba (last visited May 1, 
2011) (―Small business is America‘s most powerful engine of opportunity and economic growth.‖). 
 301. See supra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (describing combination of preferences, 
including small business preference, under TACPA); see also Roney, supra note 70, at 958 (observing 
that ―goals of the [HUBZone program] . . . might have been better achieved by adopting . . . a 10 
percent price preference for [small businesses] and a 5 percent one for larger companies in 
HUBZones‖). 
 302. See FRAUD REPORT, supra note 290 (describing recent fraud issues); see also supra notes 
230, 237 and accompanying text (describing HUBZone certification process). 
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application best achieves this goal while also being administratively 
convenient.
303
 Therefore, governments adopting these programs should 
choose the approach that is least costly to implement, which is likely the 
one most consistent with its existing preference programs. Although far 
from determinative, one factor weighing in favor of some sort of ongoing 
certification is the ability to maintain a list of registered businesses to 
whom other bidding and subcontracting opportunities can be marketed.
304
 
Finally, the program should adopt any other aspects that are necessary 
as a matter of political practicality to their implementation. The most 
obvious examples of these limits are ownership and control 
requirements.
305
 These requirements do not fit neatly into the framework 
of providing preferences to encourage job creation in the areas that need 
the economic boost, and they impose serious administrative costs in 
auditing.
306
 However, such theoretically unnecessary limitations may in 
fact be necessary in response to such political pressures as the ―buy 
American‖ movement and to budgetary pressures in a time of economic 
crisis.
307
 Other such limits that may be necessary for similar reasons are 
those graduating a business from the program after excessive use (as does 
EDA)
308
 and caps on the absolute dollar amount of the preference (as does 
TACPA).
309
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although state-sponsored, race-conscious affirmative action continues 
to disappear by force of ballot initiative and Supreme Court mandate, three 
existing ―place-not-race‖ programs, as well as the underlying theory of 
class-based affirmative action, serve as models to states and local 
governments who seek a novel way to continue using government 
contracting as a means of effectuating socioeconomic policy. Although 
 
 
 303. Cf. supra Part II.D.2.f (discussing and analyzing these approaches). 
 304. See supra notes 230, 231 and accompanying text (discussing similar lists under HUBZone 
and EDA). 
 305. See Roney, supra note 70, at 958 (noting that ―[a]llowing businesses that might have non–
U.S. citizens among ownership or key personnel [to receive HUBZone preferences] still would have 
brought jobs to these areas of high unemployment‖). 
 306. Cf. BEALE & DEAS, supra note 161, at 178 (describing the difficulty of obtaining ownership 
data in assessing effectiveness of program); Roney, supra note 70, at 944 (noting the ―onerous 
requirement to inquire into every stockowner‘s citizenship‖). 
 307. Cf. Miller, supra note 132, at 378–79 (hypothesizing that this ―somewhat peculiar‖ 
requirement in the HUBZone program is a recognition that ―our government has limited resources, and 
it had chosen to distribute those limited resources only to its citizens‖). 
 308. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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such programs will not, by themselves, end all of society‘s economic 
problems,
310
 they are worth pursuing to make sure that relative equality of 
opportunity remains a consideration in the area of government contracting, 
as it has since President Kennedy began the federal affirmative action 
program nearly fifty years ago. These programs may in fact signal a shift 
from the ―[r]acial [b]attleground to the [e]conomic [c]ommon 
[g]round.‖311 To be sure, although he hesitates to extend his logic to the 
employment context, even Ward Connerly favors giving ―those who are 
disadvantaged some break‖ in the education context, ―assuming they are 
generally qualified.‖312 
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 310. See Fallon, supra note 87, at 1944 (concluding that political and economic barriers could lead 
to class-based affirmative action being less effective than programs aimed at ―the broader problem of 
poverty‖ because only a limited amount of people would benefit from class-based affirmative action). 
 311. See Miller, supra note 132, at 367.  
 312. See Lori Leibovich, The Anti-Affirmative Action Campaign Goes National, SALON, 
http://www.salon.com/news/news970116.html (last visited May 1, 2011). Connerly has stated that he 
―surely do[es]n‘t support giving assistance to anyone seeking a job on the basis of their class or 
income or whatever; if you‘re unemployed, you‘re unemployed.‖ Id. However, his view that education 
is an appropriate place for preferences because it is ―the key to success in life,‖ id., seems to be in line 
with the larger theme that class-based affirmative action should target people at ―‗meritocratic crisis 
points‘ relatively early in life.‖ See supra note 125 and accompanying text. Even though Connerly 
hesitates to go so far as to support the types of programs described herein, other key players in 
Connerly‘s movement have made it clear that they ―favor[] some alternative to affirmative action 
based solely on need and ignoring sex and race—at least for entry-level jobs and college admissions.‖ 
See Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, supra note 84, at 1059 & n.126 (quoting Paul M. 
Barrett & G. Pascal Zachary, Budding Backlash? Race, Sex Preferences Could Become Target In 
Voter Shift to Right, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1995, at A1). 
  J.D. (2011), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2008), Creighton University. I 
thank my wife, family, and friends for their support. I also thank the editors of the Washington 
University Law Review for their editorial assistance. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss5/6
